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ABSTRACT
EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN ONLINE RETAIL OPERATIONS AND DYNAMIC
PRICING
Jiaqi Xu
Marshall L. Fisher
This dissertation studies empirical problems in retail operations management and dynamic
pricing through three essays. The first essay studies the financial impact of offering faster
delivery in online retail. Using econometric policy analysis framework, we study a quasiexperimental setting in which a group of U.S. customers for a large apparel retailer experienced a reduction in delivery time due to the opening of a new distribution center (DC). We
show that faster delivery increased sales growth by 0.58% per week following the opening
of the new DC, with the effect varying inversely with respect to distance from the new
DC. The second essay studies the design of free shipping threshold policy in online retail
using transaction data from a major online apparel retailer. We develop models of customer
demand and product return behavior that are consistent with empirical data to determine
the optimal level of free shipping threshold. In particular, we incorporate a behavior called
order padding, in which customers deliberately inflate their orders to qualify for free shipping, and its effect on product return. We analyze the model to show that a free shipping
threshold policy is most effective when the retailer faces high product margin, low shipping
revenue, low product return probability, and when order padding does not cause customers
to delay future purchase. The third essay studies practical issues in large-scale multiproduct
dynamic pricing. We partner with a Major League Baseball (MLB) franchise to develop a
demand model for its single-game tickets. The demand model is then used to evaluate the
effectiveness of dynamic pricing policies. The demand model indicates that due to various
practical constraints in pricing, the franchise was unable to benefit from the use of dynamic
pricing. We address these issues and use simulation to show that revenue improvement of
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up to 15% can be achieved through the effective use of dynamic pricing. We also show that
a properly calibrated fixed pricing policy based on a detailed demand model can achieve
similar levels of revenue improvement as the optimal dynamic pricing policy.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iii

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xii

CHAPTER 1 :

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

CHAPTER 2 :

The Value of Rapid Delivery in Online Retailing . . . . . . . . . . .

3

2.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

2.2

Empirical Setting and Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.3

Model Specification and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

2.4

The Impact of Delivery Distance on the Rapid Delivery Effect . . . . . . . .

25

2.5

The Mechanism of the Rapid Delivery Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

2.6

Conclusion

40

CHAPTER 3 :

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Maximizing Profitability in Online Retail through a Free Shipping
Threshold Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

3.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

3.2

Empirical Evidences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

3.3

Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

3.4

Free Shipping Threshold Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

3.5

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78

3.6

Conclusion

83

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii

CHAPTER 4 :

The Revenue Impact of Dynamic Pricing Policies in Major League
Baseball Ticket Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

4.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

4.2

Empirical Setting and Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

4.3

Customer Demand Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

4.4

Model Estimation and Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

4.5

Evaluating Dynamic Pricing Policies Using the Demand Model . . . . . . .

109

4.6

Conclusion

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

119

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

120

viii

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1 :

Summary Demographic Statistics for Treatment and Control ZIP
Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

TABLE 2 :

The Revenue Impact of the Western DC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

TABLE 3 :

The Revenue Impact of the Western DC at 12 Week Treatment
Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

TABLE 4 :

The Weekly Revenue Impact of the Western DC . . . . . . . . . . .

16

TABLE 5 :

Propensity Score Covariate Balance Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

TABLE 6 :

The Revenue Impact of the Western DC at 12 Week Treatment
Intervals (Propensity Score Adjusted) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

TABLE 7 :

The Revenue Impact of the Western DC (Propensity Score Adjusted) 20

TABLE 8 :

The Revenue Impact of the Western DC at 12 Week Treatment
Intervals (Panel Poisson Regression) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TABLE 9 :

21

The Weekly Revenue Impact of the Western DC (Panel Poisson Regression) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

TABLE 10 : The Weekly Revenue Impact of the Western DC . . . . . . . . . . .

22

TABLE 11 : The Revenue Impact of the Western DC and Extreme Weather Event 23
TABLE 12 : Placebo Test with Fictitious Treatment on Week 24 (Weeks 1-40) .

24

TABLE 13 : The Impact of Distance from the Western DC on the Rapid Delivery
Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

TABLE 14 : Distribution Centers of Select U.S. Apparel Retailers . . . . . . . .

31

TABLE 15 : The Impact of the Western DC on Revenue Components (All Customers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

TABLE 16 : The Revenue Impact of the Western DC (Recent vs Existing Customers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

TABLE 17 : The Revenue Impact of the Western DC on B&M Store Sales . . .

37

ix

TABLE 18 : The Revenue Impact of the Western DC on a B&M Store Sales
(Distance DiD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

TABLE 19 : The Interaction between the Rapid Delivery Effect and Retail Store
Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

TABLE 20 : The Interaction between the Rapid Delivery Effect and B&M Store
Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

TABLE 21 : Product Return Regression Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

TABLE 22 : Customer Demand Model Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . .

63

TABLE 23 : Actual Change vs Model Prediction on the Effect of Lower Free
Shipping Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

TABLE 24 : The Effect of Lower Free Shipping Threshold on Sales . . . . . . .

69

TABLE 25 : Customer Demand Model Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . .

73

TABLE 26 : Model Fit of Various Demand Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

TABLE 27 : List of Model Parameters

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

TABLE 28 : Comparison of NBD, Poisson and OLS Model . . . . . . . . . . . .

96

TABLE 29 : List of Seat Sections in the Stadium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

TABLE 30 : Game Demand Model and Ticket Quantity Model Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

100

TABLE 31 : Seat Section Choice Model Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . .

101

TABLE 32 : Predicted Total Revenue vs Actual Total Revenue . . . . . . . . . .

108

TABLE 33 : Expected Revenue for Initial Fixed Prices vs Actual Dynamic Prices 110
TABLE 34 : Expected Revenue from Optimized Dynamic Pricing Policies (43
Home Games) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

112

TABLE 35 : Expected Revenue from Optimized Fixed Pricing Policies (43 Home
Games) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

116

TABLE 36 : Expected Revenue from Decision-Rule Based Prices . . . . . . . . .

118

x

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1 :

Map of Demand Assignments to Eastern and Western DC . . . .

8

FIGURE 2 :

Basket Size Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

FIGURE 3 :

Return Probability vs Original Basket Size . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

FIGURE 4 :

Return Amount vs Original Basket Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

FIGURE 5 :

Variance of the Return Proportion vs Original Basket Size . . . .

51

FIGURE 6 :

Empirical vs Simulated Basket Size Distribution . . . . . . . . . .

64

FIGURE 7 :

Expected Basket Size Function D(τ ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

FIGURE 8 :

Expected Return Cost Function Q(τ ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

FIGURE 9 :

Expected Profit Per Order Function Π(τ ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

FIGURE 10 : Expected Profit Per Dollar Sales Π(τ )/D(τ ) . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

FIGURE 11 : Break-Even Analysis for Deviation from the Optimal Free Shipping
Threshold (τ ∗ = 500, η = 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

FIGURE 12 : Sensitivity of the Optimal Expected Profit per Dollar Sales to the
Padding Parameter α . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

FIGURE 13 : Sensitivity of the Optimal Expected Profit per Dollar Sales to the
Product Return Parameter ρ1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

FIGURE 14 : Expected Profit Per Dollar Sales (2011 Q1 Only vs 2011 Q1 + 2012
Q1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

FIGURE 15 : Basket Size Histogram Model Fit (Order Padding Model with Secondary Demand) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

FIGURE 16 : Basket Size Histogram Model Fit (Order Padding Model with Upper Tail Demand) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

FIGURE 17 : Actual Price Path of Select Seat Sections for a Sample Home Game 91
FIGURE 18 : Boxplot of Forecast Errors from the Game Demand Model . . . .

xi

105

FIGURE 19 : Density Plot of Forecast Errors from the Game Demand Model
Near Zero

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

106

FIGURE 20 : Average Forecast Error with Respect to Days Until Game Day . .

106

FIGURE 21 : Forecast vs Actual Number of Orders Aggregated by Each Game

106

FIGURE 22 : Comparison of Game-by-Game Revenue Forecast (Simulation vs
Approximation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

108

FIGURE 23 : Predicted Total Revenue vs Actual Total Revenue . . . . . . . . .

109

FIGURE 24 : Model Optimized Price Path for a Home Game (Myopic Dynamic
Prices) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

113

FIGURE 25 : Price Path of Optimized Myopic Dynamic Pricing Policy (5% Discount Allowed). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

114

FIGURE 26 : Price Path of Optimized Single-Day Fixed Pricing Policy (5% Discount Allowed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

116

FIGURE 27 : Price Path of Decision-Rule Based Pricing Policy (5% Discount
Allowed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xii

118

CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
This dissertation studies empirical problems in retail operation management and dynamic
pricing through three essays.
In the first essay, we study the financial impact of offering faster delivery in online retail. For
online retailers who sell physical goods, every transaction has two main components: the
physical product and the services by which the retailer facilitates the transaction. Delivery
speed is arguably the most important service component for online retailers, but we are
aware of no empirical studies that demonstrate and quantify the economic value of faster
delivery. Thus, online retailers still face an important open question: does the benefits
from reducing delivery time outweigh the costs? We use a quasi-natural experiment – the
opening of a new online distribution center (DC), which shortened the delivery time for a
large group of western U.S. customers of a leading U.S. apparel retailer – to estimate the
impact of faster delivery on revenue. We show that faster delivery increased sales growth by
0.58% per week following the opening of the new DC, with the effect varying inversely with
respect to distance from the new DC. Our analysis shows that the revenue increase mainly
comes from customers increasing their order frequency and that more recently acquired
customers and frequent purchasers are the most responsive to faster delivery. We also find
that the effect of faster delivery is weakened when local offline retail competition is strong,
but can be strengthened when the same retailer has an offline presence. We conservatively
estimate that the new DC helped improve the partner retailer’s net profit by 2.1%.
In the second essay, we study the optimal design of free shipping threshold policies in online
retail. Free shipping threshold policies are widely used in online retail, but there is a lack
of understanding on how customers alter their behavior under the influence of such policy.
We present a data-driven methodology to analyze this problem and identify the profit
maximizing free shipping threshold. We develop a series of models whose key assumptions
derive from the empirical observation that customers often increase their basket size at
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checkout to qualify for free shipping in a practice known as order padding. Even though
order padding leads to an increase in the average basket size, it also leads to the loss of
shipping revenue and increases the probability of product returns. We apply our models to
actual transaction data from an online retailer and demonstrate that free shipping threshold
decisions can have significant impact on online retailer profit (up to 20% profit in this
specific case). Our analysis also shows that a free shipping threshold policy is most effective
in helping retailer maximize profit when the retailer faces high product margin and low
shipping revenue. We also find that a free shipping threshold policy is more effective when
the probability of product return is low and when order padding does not cause customers
to delay their future purchases.
In the third essay, we study the implementation of multiproduct dynamic pricing policy
by a Major League Baseball franchise on its single-game tickets. We develop and apply
a comprehensive customer choice model to help design dynamic pricing policies for the
franchise. Our model encompasses all relevant aspects of customer demand generation
process, including ticket quantity and stadium seat section choice. Furthermore, our demand
model incorporates external factors that drive customer valuation of sports tickets such as
the home team’s on-field performance and observed overall attendance level at the time of
purchase. Our counterfactual results show potential revenue improvement of up to 15%
through the effective use of dynamic pricing. We also find that a properly calibrated fixed
pricing policy based on a detailed customer demand model can achieve similar levels of
revenue improvement as the optimal dynamic pricing policy.
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CHAPTER 2 : The Value of Rapid Delivery in Online Retailing
2.1. Introduction
For retailers who sell physical goods, every transaction has two main components: the
physical product and the services by which the retailer facilitates the customers purchase.
In online retail, one of the most important service component is delivery speed. For this
reason, many retailers are taking steps to offer shorter delivery time to customers at no
additional cost. For example, Amazon now offer free same-day delivery in some locations
for its Prime members in addition to the original offer of free two-day shipping (Bensinger
2015). Many multichannel retailers have made efforts to allow fulfillment from their physical
stores so that there is shorter delivery distance, which leads to shorter delivery time (Ryan
2013).
Despite the industry-wide emphasis on delivery speed, there are virtually no empirical
studies that estimate the impact of faster delivery on sales. This makes it challenging for
online retailers to know whether the benefits exceed the costs in reducing delivery time for
customers. In this chapter, we answer this question in a specific context by analyzing a
quasi-natural experiment that took place when a retailer opened a new distribution center,
which significantly reduced the retailer’s delivery time to western U.S. customers.
This study was conducted in partnership with a major apparel retailer whose North American operation includes more than 300 brick-and-mortar stores across the United States.
The retailer also operates an online store and generates more than 20% of its total revenue
from the online operation. Following common practices in the industry, the retailer originally fulfilled all online orders from a single distribution center (DC) located in the eastern
U.S. In late 2012, the retailer opened a second DC in the western U.S., which significantly
reduced the delivery time to western states due to its proximity. Customers in western
states, such as California, who used to receive their orders within five to nine days, now
received their orders within two to four days.
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The retailer did not advertise or announce the resulting delivery time reduction to its
western U.S. customers. The retailer also did not update its delivery time estimate (five
to nine business days) on its online check-out screen to reflect this change. The online
shopping experience remained unchanged, except orders now arrived faster for a subset
of customers in the U.S. Thus, the opening of the western DC provides an appropriate
context to investigate how customers respond to faster delivery through econometric policy
evaluation framework.
We use the difference-in-differences approach as the main econometric tool to estimate the
sales impact of faster delivery. We refine this analysis through propensity score matching
to adjust for the non-random treatment assignment property in the empirical setting. Furthermore, we show that distance to the new western DC acts as a moderator of the main
effect. The distance based analysis shows that faster delivery results in a baseline revenue
growth of 0.58% per week that diminishes with respect to the distance to the DC at the
rate of 0.23% per week per 1,000 miles. Using regression discontinuity design, we establish
that this effect is present only in the ZIP codes served by the new western DC.
We also examine the underlying mechanism behind the observed rapid delivery effect. We
find that the sales increase is mostly driven by increase in customer order frequency, along
with smaller effects in increased rate of online store adoption and increased basket size.
We also find that more recently acquired customers and frequent purchasers are the most
responsive to faster delivery, as they are more likely to be exposed to faster delivery. At the
same time, infrequent purchasers and customers with no prior online shopping experience
also respond positively to improvement in delivery speed, despite the lack of announcement
or advertising by the retailer. We show that this is because customers learn about delivery
speed based on actual delivery time and communicate this information among each other.
We also show that the observed sales increase in the online store is a net increase, since
physical stores were unaffected by faster deliveries in the online channel. Finally, we find
that the effect of faster delivery becomes weaker in ZIP codes with a larger number of retail
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store counts but can become stronger when there is the partner retailer’s physical presence.
This indicates that while offline stores and online stores act as substitutes in general, offline
stores operated by the same firm can act as a complement to the online store.
Based on the sales impact estimate, the new western DC is conservatively estimated to
generate 2.1% net profit improvement for the retailer. This research lends empirical justification to the substantial efforts by major online retailers to increase delivery speed – efforts
that up to now have been based almost exclusively on faith and anecdotal evidence.
2.1.1. Related Literature
Fulfillment operation and related service plays an important role in online and multichannel
retail. Early conceptual studies in e-commerce such as Keeney (1999) and Swaminathan
and Tayur (2003) have identified faster delivery as a key factor to operating a successful
online business. Ho and Zheng (2004) have further extended this idea by considering a
marketing-OM interface model of service competition in which firms optimize the delivery
time commitment and actual delivery quality. In this chapter, we take a similar view and
investigate how operational characteristics (delivery time) can impact sales as a service
quality measure.
There is an extensive body of marketing literature on the role of convenience and service
quality, as outlined in the review articles by Berry et al. (2002) and Rust and Chung (2006).
Of particular interest among these works are papers that discuss the financial impact of service levels and service quality. These papers have focused largely on measuring the impact
of service quality variability on customer retention. Gans (2002) studies how random variations in the service quality affect the long-run market share of a firm. Anderson et al.
(2006) study the long-term effects of stockouts on customer lifetime value (CLV). Bolton
et al. (2006) studies the effect of positive customer experience on customer retention. Most
recently, Sriram et al. (2015) study the effect of service quality variability on customer retention. In this chapter, we evaluate the financial impact of a pure service quality improvement
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and measure its long-run effect in terms of weekly sales and order count.
We use delivery time as a measure of service quality. This measure is similar to service
waiting time, which is commonly used as a service quality measure in the service operations
literature. There is now a growing body of empirical work in this domain related to quantifying the effects of waiting time and queue length in various service settings (Allon et al.
2011, Aksin et al. 2013, Lu et al. 2013, Batt and Terwiesch 2015). In this setting, however,
delivery time is largely determined by physical distance from the distribution center to the
customer rather than the service speed. We use this natural variation in delivery speed
within the continental U.S. to establish the causal relationship between delivery speed and
the observed effect on sales.
We contribute to the literature by providing an empirical estimate of the financial impact
of improved service quality and an understanding of how this effect develops over time in a
highly relevant, albeit specific, industry context. We also investigate mechanisms that lead
to the observed phenomenon, and explore its offline-online channel interaction implications.
For academics, these results are valuable because it leads to an improved understanding of
multichannel marketing and operations. Most works in this area focuses on evaluating the
financial impact of changes in the offline channel, such as store openings (Forman et al. 2009,
Avery et al. 2012, Kumar et al. 2014), inventory showroom openings (Bell et al. 2015), and
implementation of buy-online-pickup-at-store (BOPS) services (Gallino and Moreno 2014,
Gao and Su 2016). To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to investigate
the effect of online channel operation on both online and offline channels. The nuanced
results on the impact of service quality improvement in online channel help deepen the
understanding on online-offline channel interactions in multichannel retail.
Practitioners in online and multichannel retail also benefits from these insights, as they will
be able to better evaluate key strategic decisions related to the development and expansion
of their business. For example, Shang et al. (2009) describe a pharmaceutical company’s
distribution network redesign initiative that resulted in lower distribution cost and higher
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on-time delivery rate. These activities would necessitate firms to have good understanding
on the financial impact of delivery speed, which this work provides. The results in this
chapter also provide empirical justification for a variety of distribution network design and
facility location models that incorporate the effect of delivery speed on demand (Eskigun
et al. 2005, Aboolian et al. 2007, Aboolian et al. 2012).

2.2. Empirical Setting and Data Description
We now describe our quasi-experimental setting and provide a description of the data used
in the analysis. As mentioned in the introduction, we study a major apparel retailer who
had initially fulfilled all online orders from a single DC located in the eastern U.S. While
the retailer provided delivery time estimate of five to nine business days for all continental
U.S. regions, the geographic location of the eastern DC lead to variations in delivery times
across the country. Customers in the eastern U.S. only needed to wait two to four days
before receiving their orders using the standard ground shipping option, whereas customers
in the western U.S. had to wait the full five to nine days before receiving their orders using
the same ground shipping option.
In late 2012, the retailer completed the construction of a new DC in the western U.S.,
which was then used to fulfill western U.S. orders1 As a result, customers in the western
U.S. experienced a significant reduction in delivery time and received their online orders
in two to four days using the standard ground shipping option. The retailer assigned each
ZIP code to a single, primary distribution center, based on its geographic location. Figure
1 shows the assignment of the ZIP codes to each DC, with the light grey ZIP codes being
served by the new western DC.
The retailer did not advertise or announce shorter delivery times to its western U.S. customers. The delivery time estimate on the online store check-out screen using standard
ground shipping option remained five to nine days for all U.S. customers after the opening
1

To preserve confidentiality, the location of the new DC cannot be disclosed.
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Figure 1: Map of Demand Assignments to Eastern and Western DC
of the western DC. This arrangement was intentional, since the retailer was building up
western DC inventory during the first 3 months of its operation. There would be some
cases where western U.S. customers still had to be served by the eastern DC during this
period, and the retailer chose to be conservative in providing delivery time promises. This
cross-region fulfillment became a rare occurrence after the first 3 months when the western
DC stocked the full product assortment and operated at normal capacity. However, the
delivery time estimate remains five to nine days even to this day. The retailer also did not
lower its inventory requirement in the eastern DC, resulting in no change in the overall
service level for eastern U.S. customers throughout the observation period.
The opening of the western DC provides us with a quasi-natural experiment setting where
a policy decision resulted in a group of customers experiencing shorter delivery time. These
customers were not told that their orders would arrive faster before or after the policy
change, but would observe that a higher proportion of orders were arriving much earlier
than the promised delivery time. We use difference-in-differences framework to evaluate and
quantify the effect of faster delivery on sales among the treated customers by comparing
them to customers who were unaffected by this policy change.We then combine the result of
this analysis with cost information obtained from the partner retailer to evaluate whether
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the value of providing faster delivery exceeds the cost of providing such services.
The analysis covers a total of 25,037 ZIP codes. After the opening of the new distribution
center, the eastern DC served 21,043 ZIP codes and the new western DC served 3,994 ZIP
codes. The observation period runs from January 2012 to June 2013 for a total of 78 weeks,
with the western DC opening on week 41. The data set is a full balanced panel data and
includes observations of weeks with zero sales at certain ZIP codes.
The partner retailer shared weekly dollar sales, order count, and item count data from its
U.S. online and brick-and-mortar (B&M) stores during the observation period. The online
sales data are disaggregated at the ZIP code level for non-post office box and non-business
ZIP codes in the continental U.S., and the B&M sales data is disaggregated at the store
level. The retailer excluded sales from orders involving gift cards or employee discounts
from the data a priori, following their standard data analysis protocol. The retailer also
provided customer acquisition data, in the form of the weekly count of online customers
placing an order for the first time at each ZIP code.
We obtained ZIP code level demographic and geographic data in addition to the sales data.
In particular, we use the data from the 2010 ESRI Demographics and Business Database,
and the latitude and longitude data for each ZIP code and the two DCs. We focus on
seven demographic variables summarized in Table 1. These additional demographic and
geographic data is used to address the non-random treatment assignment nature of the
quasi-experimental setting and to examine the causal relationship between delivery speed
and the observed effect on sales.

2.3. Model Specification and Results
In this section, we analyze the effect of the new DC on online sales using a difference-indifferences (DiD) methodology. We show that the opening of the new western DC resulted in
a higher rate of sales increase in the treatment ZIP codes compared to the control ZIP codes
over the observation period. We then refine these results with propensity score adjustment
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Table 1: Summary Demographic Statistics for Treatment and Control ZIP Codes

Total population
Population of females
Population density
Median age
Median per capita income
# of apparel stores
Annual apparel store sales

Treatment ZIP Codes
Mean
Stdev
17,720
18,802
8,885
9,456
2,093
4,185
38.7
8.2
25,850
12,414
13.9
33.5
6,815,044 20,190,612

Control ZIP Codes
Mean
Stdev
11,166
13,651
5,698
7,025
1,390
5,498
40.0
5.9
24,198
9,826
8.0
24.3
3,996,098 19,953,088

The treatment and control group include 3,994 and 21,043 ZIP codes respectively.

to control for differences in ZIP code level characteristics between the treatment and control
group. Finally, we present results from alternative model formulations and robustness tests.
2.3.1. The Differences-in-Differences Methodology
The difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology has a long and well-documented history of
applications in social sciences (Angrist and Pischke 2008). This methodology is widely used
in economic policy evaluation studies, including several papers that focus on multichannel
retail (Avery et al. 2012, Gallino and Moreno 2014, Bell et al. 2015).
To analyze a quasi-experimental setting through the DiD methodology, it is necessary to
first identify a subset of the population called the treatment group who are affected by the
intervention. The treatment group is then compared to a control group (or the untreated
group) who are comparable to the treatment group but were unaffected by the intervention.
In this setting, the treatment group consists of customers in geographic locations assigned to
the new western DC, shown in light gray in Figure 1. The control group consists of customers
in geographic locations assigned to the original eastern DC, shown in dark gray in Figure
1. The treatment of interest is the opening of the new western DC. The treatment group
customers would experience a reduction in delivery time (due to the geographic proximity of
the new DC) over time, whereas the control group customers would experience no change in
their delivery time since they would be served by the same DC throughout the observation
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period. The outcome of interest is the weekly sales at each ZIP code.
The DiD methodology uses weekly sales in control ZIP codes as the benchmark to evaluate
the change in weekly sales in treated ZIP codes following the opening of the western DC. By
comparing the differences in the outcome of interest between treatment and control groups
over time, DiD methodology controls for unobserved characteristics that can affect the
outcome of interest. In this case, the use of DiD methodology controls for time invariant
but geographically variant factors (e.g. demographics) and geographically invariant but
time variant factors (e.g. macroeconomic shocks). It is important to apply these controls
since retail sales can be affected by a variety of factors unrelated to the new DC such as
the introduction of a new apparel collection or holiday shopping.
Before applying the DiD regression, we confirm the critical parallel trends assumption to
rule out the possibility of a different pre-treatment trend in the dependent variable (weekly
sales) between the treatment and control groups. A difference in pre-treatment trend would
introduce bias to the DiD estimate and may invalidate its conclusions. The following model
is estimated using sales data from the pre-treatment period:

log(SALESit ) = δ0 + δ1 T REATi + δ2 t + δ3 (T REATi · t) + it .

(2.1)

In the above regression, i = 1 represents the treatment group and i = 0 represents the
control group. t denotes the number of weeks since the start of the observation period.
T REATi is equal to the group i. The coefficient of interest is δ3 , which measures the
difference in the sales trend between the treatment and control ZIP codes.
There is no statistically significant difference in the pre-treatment sales growth rate between
the treatment and the control ZIP codes (δ3 = −0.0011, s.e. = 0.0019, t = −0.6). This
result also rules out the concern of a retailer selection bias that could arise if the partner
retailer opened the new DC to serve regions with high sales growth. We have interviewed the
management team of the partner retailer to confirm that addressing fast growing markets
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was not the reason behind opening a new western DC. The result of the parallel trends
analysis corroborates this claim.
Following the validation of the parallel trends assumption, we estimate the sales impact of
the new western DC using the following model specification:

log(SALESit ) = α0 + α1 T REATi · AF T ERt + α2 T REATi + α3 AF T ERt + it .

(2.2)

Here, i denotes a particular ZIP code and t denotes the number of weeks since the start of the
observation period. The binary variable T REATi is equal to 1 if ZIP code i belongs to the
treatment group, and the binary variable AF T ERt is equal to 1 if week t corresponds to the
post-treatment period. The variable of interest T REATi · AF T ERt captures whether a ZIP
code i was being served by the new DC at time t. We estimate the model using generalized
linear model with log link function and Gaussian errors. This estimation method allows the
log-transformation of the dependent variable even when there are weeks with zero sales in
certain ZIP codes2 . Table 2 presents the results from the DiD regression.
Table 2: The Revenue Impact of the Western DC

T REAT · AF T ER
T REAT
AF T ER
Observations
Number of ZIP codes
Log-likelihood
AIC

log (SALES)
0.0062
(0.0090)
0.7275∗∗∗
(0.0064)
0.3578∗∗∗
(0.0048)
1,952,886
25,037
−1.598 × 107
3.197 × 107

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001

2

Another less formal way to achieve log-transformation in the dependent variable with observations of
value zero is to use panel Poisson regression. This approach has the benefit of being able to apply ZIP code
level fixed effect controls. However, in this setting, since the treatment is applied to the same group over
the same period of time, ZIP code level fixed effect is perfectly collinear with the T REATi main effect in
the regression. Similarly, weekly seasonality controls are not required since they would be perfectly collinear
with the AF T ERt main effect. The results of the panel Poisson regressions are presented in Chapter 2.3.3.
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Table 2 shows that the coefficient of interest, α1 , is positive but statistically insignificant.
On the surface, the result seems to suggest that the opening of the new DC did not have any
effect on sales. However, the estimate from the simple DiD regression is the time-weighted
average treatment effect on the treated ZIP codes. Given that the retailer did not announce
the opening of the western DC, one would expect the effect to manifest itself over time as
customers learn about faster delivery over time rather than as a one-time boost on week
41. Furthermore, the new western DC did not handle all western U.S. orders during the
initial inventory build-up period, which lasted approximately 12 weeks. The presence of
such build-up period could also hamper the treatment effectiveness during the initial phase
of the new DC operation.
Two additional treatment variables AF T ER53t and AF T ER65t and their interaction term
with T REATi can be introduced to the DiD regression:
log(SALESit ) = α0 + α1 T REATi · AF T ERt + α2 T REATi + α3 AF T ERt
+ α4 T REATi · AF T ER53t + α5 AF T ER53t

(2.3)

+ α6 T REATi · AF T ER65t + α7 AF T ER65t + it .
Here, AF T ER53t is equal to one for if week t is after observation week 52, and AF T ER65t
is equal to one if week t is after observation week 64. The interaction term T REATi ·
AF T ER53t captures the cumulative treatment effect between weeks 53-64, while the interaction term T REATi · AF T ER65t captures the cumulative treatment effect between weeks
65-78. Table 3 shows the estimates from this regression.
Table 3 shows that the operation of the new DC indeed helped increased sales in the treated
ZIP codes. At first, sales in treated ZIP codes was 3.5% lower relative to control ZIP codes
during the inventory build-up period (weeks 41-52)3 . However, sales in weeks 53-64 was
6.1% higher relative to control ZIP codes. There is some residual positive effect between
3

Weekly sales was higher in the post-treatment period than in the pre-treatment period for both the
treated and control ZIP codes.
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Table 3: The Revenue Impact of the Western DC at 12 Week Treatment Intervals

T REAT · AF T ER
T REAT · AF T ER53
T REAT · AF T ER65
T REAT
AF T ER
AF T ER53
AF T ER65
Observations
Number of ZIP codes
Log-likelihood
AIC

log (SALES)
−0.0358∗∗
(0.0125)
0.0595∗∗∗
(0.0155)
0.0177
(0.0154)
0.7275∗∗∗
(0.0064)
0.6098∗∗∗
(0.0066)
−0.4867∗∗∗
(0.0082)
0.1661∗∗∗
(0.0083)
1,952,886
25,037
−1.598 × 107
3.196 × 107

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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weeks 65-78 but this effect is not statistically significant. The magnitude of the timeweighted average treatment effect based on this DiD estimate is 0.49%. Similar results can
be obtained based on DiD regression with different length of treatment intervals. Thus, we
find that the operation of the new western DC is associated with higher sales in treated ZIP
codes compared to control ZIP codes, but only after the initial inventory build-up period.
Finally, we introduce the DiD specification with a continuous post-treatment status variable
AF T ERW EEKt , which will serve as the basis for further analysis:
log(SALESit ) = α0 + α1 T REATi · AF T ERW EEKt + α2 T REATi
(2.4)
+ α3 AF T ERW EEKt + it .
Here, AF T ERW EEKt denotes the number of weeks since the beginning of treatment. This
variable is set to zero for weeks 1-40. This specification allows us to examine additional
interactions more easily. Table 4 presents the estimates of this regression. The result shows
that each week of the new western DC operation helped increase treated ZIP codes sales
relative to control ZIP codes by 0.13% per week on average4 . Cumulatively, at the end of
our observation period (week 78), sales in the treated ZIP codes is 5.1% higher than the
sales in the control ZIP code.
2.3.2. Propensity Score Matching and Weighting
The results from the previous section show evidence of a positive revenue impact of the new
DC. However, a key challenge in this empirical setting is that the ZIP codes are not randomly
assigned to receive the treatment of faster delivery. Treated ZIP codes received faster
delivery because they were assigned to the new western DC based on geographic proximity.
The non-random assignment to treatment can lead to imbalances in key demographic factors
between the treated ZIP codes and control ZIP codes. As shown in Table 1, there are
4

Note that this estimate is the average growth rate during our observation period.The same growth rate
is not expected to continue beyond the observation period. As indicated by the statistically insignificant
estimate of the sales impact in weeks 65-78 from Table 3, this effect should decrease and eventually reach
zero. However, assuming a linear treatment effect with respect to time is helpful because it provides a concise
specification for triple DiD regressions that can be used to investigate various interaction effects.
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Table 4: The Weekly Revenue Impact of the Western DC

T REAT · AF T ERW EEK
T REAT
AF T ERW EEK
Observations
Number of ZIP codes
Log-likelihood
AIC

log (SALES)
0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0003)
0.7170∗∗∗
(0.0055)
0.0067∗∗∗
(0.0002)
1,952,886
25,037
−1.599 × 107
3.197 × 107

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001

significant differences in key demographic statistics between treated ZIP codes and control
ZIP codes. To address the concern of unrepresentative comparison between the two groups,
propensity score adjustment is applied to the DiD regression to correct for imbalances in
the observable characteristics between the two groups.
Propensity score represents the probability of treatment given a set of observed covariates.
It can act as a proxy measure to evaluate how similar a particular subject (in this case, a ZIP
code) is to an average treated subject. This measure can be used to either select a subset
of the control group that is comparable to the treated group in terms of average observed
characteristic, or add regression weights to each observation based on the propensity score.
Both approaches apply appropriate adjustments to the data to make an average treated
subject and an average control subject appear similar in terms of the observed covariates,
effectively mimicking a randomized experiment.
The review article by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) provides an extensive discussion on the
econometrics of program evaluation that includes the propensity score weighting method
implemented in this analysis. Among all the methodologies considered in their article, the
propensity score weighting approach is deemed to be among the most attractive methods
for analyzing quasi-natural experiments. Further details on the application of propensity
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score methods can be found in Rosenbaum (1987), Hirano and Imbens (2001), and Hirano
et al. (2003).
Following the methodology described in Hirano and Imbens (2001) and Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009), the propensity score ê(xi ) is estimated through a logistic regression, where xi represents the vector of observed covariates for a particular subject. The seven ZIP code level
demographic attributes shown in Table 1 are used as the vector of observed covariates. The
regression weight ω is defined as follows:

ω(Wi , xi ) =

Wi
1 − Wi
+
.
ê(xi ) 1 − ê(xi )

Here, Wi denotes the treatment status and Wi = 1 if ZIP code i belongs to the treatment
group and Wi = 0 otherwise. Another variation of this method is to use probit regression
to estimate the propensity score ê(xi ). Our results are robust to using both logit and probit
regression.
In the matching approach, one-on-one matching is performed without replacement on the
treated ZIP codes and the control ZIP codes to minimize the propensity score differences
between the two groups. Only the treatment group and the matched subset of control
ZIP codes are then used to perform the DiD regression. However, the preferred method is
still the propensity weighting approach, since it does not exclude any of the observation as
opposed to the propensity score matching approach.
The propensity score adjustment can be validated by comparing estimates from a series of
weighted and unweighted regressions using the approach in Guo and Fraser (2014). Specifically, in these regressions, the dependent variable is a particular covariate, e.g. total population, and the independent variable is the treatment indicator, i.e., whether a ZIP code
is served from the new DC. Regression weights ω are then applied based on the propensity
score estimates.
As an example, using total population as the dependent variable, the coefficient estimate
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of the treatment status indicator variable from the unweighted regression is statistically
significant at the 0.01 level (β = 6553.99, t = 26.02). However, the coefficient estimate of
the treatment status indicator from the weighted regression using the logit link function
is statistically insignificant at the 0.01 level (β = −1294.90, t = −2.14). That is, while
western ZIP codes have higher population on average compared to eastern ZIP codes in
the unweighted case, weighting by the propensity score mitigates this difference. Similarly,
the unweighted regressions imply eastern ZIP codes have statistically different median percapita income, median age, and population density. The weighted regressions eliminate
these differences, again providing evidence that our propensity score adjustments are able
to properly balance the data. Table 5 presents results for the covariate balance for the seven
covariates listed in Table 1.
Table 5: Propensity Score Covariate Balance Check

Total Population
Population of females
Population density
Median age
Median per capita income
# of offline apparel stores
Annual apparel store sales

Unweighted
Estimate t-Value
6,554
26.0
(252)
3,187
24.7
(129)
702
7.7
(92)
-1.3
-12.1
(0.1)
1,652
9.3
(177)
5.9
13.2
(0.5)
2,818,946
8.2
(345,041)

Probit Link Function
Estimate
t-Value
-2,133
-1.65
(1,295)
-684
-1.17
(587)
-375
-1.54
(243)
1.1
1.83
(0.6)
422
1.04
(407)
-1.1
-0.94
(1.2)
-251,768
-0.66
(383,013)

Logit Link Function
Estimate
t-value
-1,295
-2.14
(605)
-519
-1.86
(280)
-264
-2.12
(124)
0.7
2.75
(0.3)
104
0.48
(218)
-0.8
-1.20
(0.7)
-314,489
-0.93
(339,282)

Standard errors in parentheses.

Tables 6 and 7 present the results from Equation 2.3 and 2.4 respectively, with propensity
score adjustment. The estimates in column 2 are based on the propensity score matching
and the estimates in column 3 are based on the propensity score weighting approach. Based
on the propensity score weighted estimate from Table 7, sales in the treated ZIP codes
increased at the rate of 0.14% per week following the opening of the new western DC.
Cumulatively, at the end of the observation period, treated ZIP codes would have 5.5%
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higher weekly sales than the control ZIP codes (3.7% higher based on estimates from Table
6).
Table 6: The Revenue Impact of the Western DC at 12 Week Treatment Intervals (Propensity Score Adjusted)

T REAT · AF T ER
T REAT · AF T ER53
T REAT · AF T ER65
T REAT
AF T ER
AF T ER53
AF T ER65
Prop. score match
Prop. score weight
Observations
Number of ZIP codes
Log-likelihood
AIC

(1)
log (SALES)
−0.0358∗∗
(0.0125)
0.0595∗∗∗
(0.0155)
0.0177
(0.0154)
0.7275∗∗∗
(0.0064)
0.6098∗∗∗
(0.0066)
−0.4867∗∗∗
(0.0082)
0.1661∗∗∗
(0.0083)
1,952,886
25,037
−1.598 × 107
3.196 × 107

(2)
log (SALES)
−0.0246
(0.0158)
0.0454∗
(0.0196)
0.0168
(0.0196)
0.0814∗∗∗
(0.0081)
0.5986∗∗∗
(0.0117)
−0.4725∗∗∗
(0.0145)
0.1671∗∗∗
(0.0147)
Yes
623,064
7,988
−5.281 × 106
1.056 × 107

(3)
log (SALES)
−0.0165
(0.0137)
0.0367∗
(0.0170)
0.0238
(0.0169)
0.1265∗∗∗
(0.0070)
0.5977∗∗∗
(0.0084)
−0.4722∗∗∗
(0.0105)
0.1642∗∗∗
(0.0107)
Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−3.268 × 107
6.537 × 107

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001

2.3.3. Alternative Model Formulations
We present the results of the analysis conducted using alternative model formulations. We
show that the results from these alternative models are consistent both qualitatively and
quantitatively as the results shown in Tables 6-7.
We first present the panel Poisson regression model result. While the use of panel Poisson
regression is technically incorrect since the dependent variable (weekly dollar sales) is not
a count data, one can introduce ZIP code fixed effects and weekly seasonality control to
the model. Table 8 presents the result from the DiD regression with 12 week treatment
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Table 7: The Revenue Impact of the Western DC (Propensity Score Adjusted)

T REAT · AF T ERW EEK
T REAT
AF T ERW EEK
Prop. score match
Prop. score weight
Observations
Number of ZIP codes
Log-likelihood
AIC

(1)
log (SALES)
0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0003)
0.7170∗∗∗
(0.0055)
0.0067∗∗∗
(0.0002)
1,952,886
25,037
−1.599 × 107
3.197 × 107

(2)
log (SALES)
0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0004)
0.0738∗∗∗
(0.0070)
0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0003)
Yes
623,064
7,988
−5.284 × 106
1.057 × 107

(3)
log (SALES)
0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0004)
0.1202∗∗∗
(0.0060)
0.0067∗∗∗
(0.0002)
Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−3.270 × 107
6.539 × 107

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001

interval. Table 9 presents the result of the continuous DiD regression. In each table, the
original DiD result is in column 1, the fixed effect and weekly seasonality result is in column
2, the propensity score matched result is in column 3, and the propensity score weighted
result is in column 4. Note that the main effects T REAT and AF T ER will drop out after
adding the fixed effect and weekly seasonality due to collinearity. All of the main results are
consistent across the generalized linear model estimation and the panel Poisson regression,
including the magnitude of the estimates.
Table 10 presents the results of a multilevel random effects (hierarchical random effects)
modeling of Equation 2.4. The random effect is on weekly observation to control for seasonality. This alternate model formulation results in nearly identical estimate on the magnitude
of the weekly effect of the western DC operation as the estimates in Table 7.
2.3.4. Robustness Tests
We now conduct robustness tests to rule out the possibility that an unobserved external
shock caused the observed sales increase in the treated ZIP codes (instead of the opening
of the western DC). To address this concern, we conduct an analysis to test the effect of
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Table 8: The Revenue Impact of the Western DC at 12 Week Treatment Intervals (Panel
Poisson Regression)
(1)
log (SALES)
T REAT · AF T ER
−0.0358∗∗∗
(0.0002)
T REAT · AF T ER53
0.0595∗∗∗
(0.0003)
T REAT · AF T ER65
0.0177∗∗∗
(0.0003)
T REAT
0.7275∗∗∗
(0.0302)
AF T ER
0.6098∗∗∗
(0.0001)
AF T ER53
−0.4867∗∗∗
(0.0002)
AF T ER65
0.1661∗∗∗
(0.0002)
Fixed effect
Seasonality
Prop. score match
Prop. score weight
Standard error
Observations
1,952,886
Number of ZIP codes
25,037
Log-likelihood
−1.514 × 108
AIC
3.027 × 108
∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001

(2)
log (SALES)
−0.0358∗∗∗
(0.0066)
0.0595∗∗∗
(0.0075)
0.0177∗
(0.0075)

(3)
log (SALES)
−0.0246∗∗
(0.0092)
0.0454∗∗∗
(0.0097)
0.0168
(0.0092)

(4)
log (SALES)
−0.0165∗∗∗
(0.0032)
0.0367∗∗∗
(0.0034)
0.0238∗∗∗
(0.0032)

Yes
Weekly
Robust
1,952,886
25,037
−1.377 × 108
2.755 × 108

Yes
Weekly
Yes
Robust
623,064
7,988
−5.536 × 107
1.107 × 108

Yes
Weekly
Yes
Robust
1,952,886
25,037
−2.840 × 108
5.680 × 108

21

Table 9: The Weekly Revenue Impact of the Western DC (Panel Poisson Regression)

T REAT · AF T ERW EEK
T REAT
AF T ERW EEK
Fixed effect
Seasonality
Prop. score match
Prop. score weight
Standard error
Observations
Number of ZIP codes
Log-likelihood
AIC
∗

(1)
log (SALES)
0.0013∗∗∗
(0.00001)
0.7168∗∗∗
(0.0302)
0.0072∗∗∗
(0.000004)
1,952,886
25,037
−1.644 × 108
3.288 × 108

(2)
log (SALES)
0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0002)

(3)
log (SALES)
0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0002)

(3)
log (SALES)
0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0001)

Yes
Weekly
Robust
1,952,886
25,037
−1.378 × 108
2.755 × 108

Yes
Weekly
Yes
Robust
623,064
7,988
−5.537 × 107
1.107 × 108

Yes
Weekly
Yes
Robust
1,952,886
25,037
−2.840 × 108
5.680 × 108

p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table 10: The Weekly Revenue Impact of the Western DC

T REAT · AF T ERW EEK
T REAT
AF T ERW EEK
2 (week)
σu1

σe2 (sales)
Observations
Number of ZIP codes

log (SALES)
0.0017∗∗∗
(0.0006)
0.7042∗∗∗
(0.0141)
0.0138∗∗∗
(0.0007)
1.97 × 108∗∗
(7.09 × 107 )
745, 506∗∗∗
(51,465)
1,952,886
25,037

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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extreme weather events, as well as a series of placebo treatment tests.
One possible explanation for the difference in sales growth between treated and control ZIP
codes is the differences in local climate. We use extreme weather events as an exogenous
differences in local climate to examine the degree to which local weather events can affect
sales. During the observation period, the eastern region of U.S. experienced a large tropical
storm named Hurricane Sandy between October 22-29 (Blake et al. 2013). The effect of this
tropical storm on online sales can be studied using the same DiD regression methodology.
Each ZIP code is labeled using a dummy variable ST ORM to indicate whether the ZIP code
was located in states that were affected by Hurricane Sandy. Another variable ST ORM W EEK
is introduced to label weeks during which the storm affected eastern U.S. (weeks 43 and
44). These two variables, as well as their interaction terms, were introduced to Equation
2.4. Table 11 presents the results of this regression.
Table 11: The Revenue Impact of the Western DC and Extreme Weather Event

T REAT · AF T ERW EEK
T REAT
AF T ERW EEK
ST ORM
ST ORM W EEK
ST ORM · ST ORM W EEK
Prop. score match
Prop. score weight
Observations
Number of ZIP codes
Log-likelihood
AIC

(1)
log (SALES)
0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0003)
0.9594∗∗∗
(0.0059)
0.0069∗∗∗
(0.0002)
0.7738∗∗∗
(0.0054)
0.0886∗∗∗
(0.0162)
−0.0161
(0.0330)
1,952,886
25,037
−1.598 × 107
3.195 × 107

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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(2)
log (SALES)
0.0011∗
(0.0004)
0.2673∗∗∗
(0.0077)
0.0070∗∗∗
(0.0004)
0.6563∗∗∗
(0.0098)
0.0944∗∗∗
(0.0188)
−0.0214
(0.0554)
Yes
623,064
7,988
−5.281 × 106
1.056 × 107

(3)
log (SALES)
0.0012∗∗
(0.0004)
0.3516∗∗∗
(0.0066)
0.0070∗∗∗
(0.0003)
0.7515∗∗∗
(0.0068)
0.0915∗∗∗
(0.0184)
−0.0136
(0.0397)
Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−3.268 × 107
6.536 × 107

The results show that Hurricane Sandy did not have a statistically significant impact on the
weekly sales in the affected ZIP codes. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that regional climate
variations play very little role in affecting online sales for the partner retailer. Thus, the
observed sales increase after the operation of the new western DC is unlikely to be caused
by variation in the regional climate.
A series of placebo tests were also conducted to rule out the possibility of spurious correlations. The DiD regression in Equation 2.4 was applied to the pre-treatment period data,
but with the T REAT variable indicating a fictitious treatment on a given week. If there
is an unobservable event at some point during the pre-treatment period that lead to the
observed sales increase in the treatment ZIP codes, then the DiD estimate of the interaction
term should be positive and statistically significant.
Table 12 reports the results for this analysis when we consider a placebo treatment in week
24. The estimate for the interaction terms is statistically insignificant. The result is the
same when using alternative placebo treatment dates. Thus, there is no evidence of an
unobserved event that may have caused to the observed sales increase in the treated ZIP
codes.
Table 12: Placebo Test with Fictitious Treatment on Week 24 (Weeks 1-40)

T REAT · AF T ERW EEK
T REAT
AF T ERW EEK
Observations
Number of ZIP codes
Log-likelihood
AIC

log (SALES)
−0.0008
(0.0013)
0.1297∗∗∗
(0.0084)
0.0251∗∗∗
(0.0008)
1,001,480
25,037
−1.639 × 107
3.277 × 107

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001

24

2.4. The Impact of Delivery Distance on the Rapid Delivery Effect
There are many operational factors, not limited to faster delivery, involved with the opening
of a new DC that may lead to an increase in revenue. In this section, we leverage the natural
variation in the delivery distance across the treated ZIP codes to support the claim that
faster delivery is the main driver of the observed revenue increase. Based on the results of
the distance-based analysis, we estimate the overall economic impact of faster delivery for
the retailer.
2.4.1. Distance-Based Triple Difference-in-Differences Regression
While the addition of the western DC resulted in faster delivery to all treated ZIP codes,
there is still significant variation in the actual distance between each treated ZIP code
and the western DC. Some treated ZIP codes are more than 1,000 miles away from the
western DC, while others are located right next to the western DC. Since the retailer fulfilled
orders through ground shipment, the variation in delivery distance leads to a corresponding
variation in delivery time (freight trucks can reasonably cover at most 500 miles in a day)
among the treated ZIP codes. If the observed revenue increase is mainly caused by faster
delivery, then the magnitude of the revenue increase should be non-uniform across the
treated ZIP codes due to the variation in delivery time. In particular, a treated ZIP code
located farther away from the western DC should experience a smaller revenue increase
than a treated ZIP code located near the western DC.
To validate the hypothesis that faster delivery is the main driver of the observed sales
increase, we estimate a triple DiD regression using distance to the western DC as a proxy
measure of delivery speed. For each ZIP code, we compute the great-circle distance to
the western DC using the latitude and longitude coordinates (expressed in thousands of
miles). The great-circle distance measures the shortest distance between two points along
the surface of a sphere and is commonly used in navigation. To validate this distance metric
as a proxy for delivery times, we collected 1,000 random pairs of addresses in the US and
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calculated the great-circle distance, the driving distance, and the driving time for each pair
using Google Maps. The correlation between the great-circle distance and driving distance,
as well as the correlation between the great-circle distance and driving time are both greater
than 0.99.
For the triple DiD regression, we define DISTi as the measure of distance between ZIP code
i and the new western DC, re-centered at 1,035 miles (the maximum distance to western DC
among treated ZIP codes, corresponding to locations near the treatment-control border).
For all treated ZIP codes, DISTi is negative and for most control ZIP codes, DISTi is
positive. The model specification for the triple DiD regression with respect to distance to
the western DC is:
log(SALESit ) = β0 + β1 T REATi · AF T ERW EEKt
+ β2 T REATi · AF T ERW EEKt · DISTi
(2.5)
+ β3 T REATi + β4 AF T ERW EEKt + β5 DISTi
+ β6 T REATi · DISTi + β7 AF T ERW EEKt · DISTi + it .
The coefficient estimate β2 is expected to be negative, since longer delivery time should be
associated with weaker effect on sales. By re-centering the distance measure DISTi , the
specification introduces a regression discontinuity effect to examine whether the effect on
sales spills over into the control ZIP codes. If β1 is positive and significant, then it would
indicate a discontinuity in the magnitude of treatment effect at the treatment-control ZIP
code border.
Table 13 presents the results of the triple DiD regression. As expected, β1 is positive and
significant and β2 is negative and significant in the original and propensity score weighted
specification. These results indicate that the positive sales impact of the western DC diminishes as the distance to the DC increases and that this effect only applies to the treatment
ZIP codes. The results are consistent under alternative measures of delivery time such as
distance to the servicing DC, amount of delivery distance reduced, and percentage of deliv-
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ery distance reduced across all specifications. In all of these cases, the treatment effect is
greater in treated ZIP codes closer to the servicing DC and treated ZIP codes with larger
delivery distance reduction.
Table 13: The Impact of Distance from the Western DC on the Rapid Delivery Effect
(1)
log (SALES)
T REAT · AF T ERW EEK
0.0031∗∗∗
(0.0008)
T REAT · AF T ERW EEK · DIST
−0.0029∗∗
(0.0010)
T REAT
1.2551∗∗∗
(0.0135)
AF T ERW EEK
0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0006)
DIST
1.2487∗∗∗
(0.0095)
T REAT · DIST
−2.3384∗∗∗
(0.0172)
AF T ERW EEK · DIST
0.0021∗∗∗
(0.0006)
Prop. score match
Prop. score weight
Observations
1,952,886
Number of ZIP codes
25,037
Log-likelihood
−1.597 × 107
AIC
3.193 × 107
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001

(2)
log (SALES)
0.0021
(0.0011)
−0.0022
(0.0013)
0.1663∗∗∗
(0.0186)
0.0054∗∗∗
(0.0010)
0.8061∗∗∗
(0.0162)
−1.8958∗∗∗
(0.0216)
0.0014
(0.0010)
Yes
623,064
7,988
−5.279 × 106
1.056 × 107

(3)
log (SALES)
0.0034∗∗∗
(0.0010)
−0.0023∗
(0.011)
0.5133∗∗∗
(0.0158)
0.0045∗∗∗
(0.0008)
1.1106∗∗∗
(0.0122)
−2.2333∗∗∗
(0.0186)
0.0021∗∗
(0.0007)
Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−3.266 × 107
6.533 × 107

The results based on the distance to the western DC is preferred over these alternative
measures for two reasons. First, it is the only continuous measure of distance that can be
re-centered. This property allows us to test the and verify the differential impact of distance
across the treated and control ZIP codes through regression discontinuity approach. Second,
the estimates from this regression can be translated easily to reasonable interpretations on
the magnitude of the rapid delivery effect across geography and over time. The estimates
from column 3 of Table 13 indicate that the weekly sales increase in a ZIP code immediately
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next to the new DC is 0.58% per week (β1 − 1.035β2 ) and that this effect decreasing at the
rate of 0.23% per week for each 1,000 miles away from the new DC. Thus, this specification
provides estimates for both the impact of distance on the rapid delivery effect (-0.23% per
week per 1,000 miles) and the upper bound of the rapid delivery effect under this setting
(0.58% per week).
Note that the coefficient estimate of the AF T ERW EEK · DIST term indicates that the
control ZIP codes has inherently higher sales growth rate than the treated ZIP codes. The
average distance to western DC is 460 miles for treated ZIP codes and 1880 miles for
control ZIP codes. Based on β7 , this would result in 0.30% higher sales growth per week
in control ZIP codes than in treated ZIP codes. This is perhaps not entirely surprising,
since customers in control ZIP codes experienced shorter delivery time for a much longer
duration than customers in treated ZIP codes. As a result, the earlier DiD estimates without
regression discontinuity design experience a negative bias. Eliminating this effect through
distance-based analysis with regression discontinuity design shows that the rapid delivery
effect is in fact much larger than the initial estimate.
The results from the distance based analysis also allow one to rule out many potential
confounding effects and alternative explanations. Given the observed decay in rapid delivery
effect with respect to distance in only the treated ZIP codes, any plausible alternative
explanation for the observed revenue increase must account for these observations. We note
again that the retailer did not announce or advertise the presence of the new DC to its
customers. The management team at the partner retailer was also able to confirm that
it does not engage in geographically targeted marketing campaign even to this day. In
addition, the observed effect is not driven by a change in inventory service level, since the
inventory level at the eastern DC was unchanged before and after the opening of the new
DC as discussed earlier. Thus, faster delivery becomes the simplest and most plausible
explanation for the observed phenomenon that is consistent with these empirical results.
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2.4.2. The Economic Impact of the Rapid Delivery Effect
Given the estimate on the rapid delivery effect and its variation across the treated ZIP
codes, it is now possible to accurately evaluate the economic impact of the western DC.
We examine whether the additional profit from the extra sales in the treated ZIP codes
exceeded the cost of operating the additional western DC using the rapid delivery effect
estimate from Table 13 (propensity score weighted) and the operational parameters of the
partner retailer.
The triple DiD estimates show that faster delivery had a baseline effect of 0.58% per week
sales growth in the treated ZIP code immediately next to the new western DC. This effect
diminishes at the rate of 0.23% per week per 1,000 miles away from the western DC. We
compute the amount of weekly sales growth by multiplying the growth rate with average
weekly sales in treated ZIP codes during weeks 1-40. The cumulative sales increase due
to faster delivery in weeks 41-78 is calculated by extrapolating the weekly sales growth
amount.
The cumulative sales increase due to the rapid delivery effect in the treated ZIP codes
between weeks 41-78 is approximately $6.40 million (+9.1%). Since the partner retailer
operates with 40% gross margin rate, this is equivalent to gross margin increase of $2.56
million. The retailer also generated cost savings from a reduction in delivery distance.
Using the actual order count data between weeks 41-78, we estimate that shorter delivery
distance to treated ZIP codes resulted in savings of $2.3 million (delivery cost is estimated
at $3 per 1,000 miles, following industry standard).
The management team at the partner retailer provided cost estimates for the additional
DC. The fixed cost of operating a DC is estimated to be $5 million per year (both the
eastern and western DC are of similar size). In addition, the partner retailer increased its
inventory level at each DC, resulting in an additional overhead of $2.5 million per year in
terms of extra inventory holding cost. Pro-rated to 38 weeks, the partner retailer took on
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an additional $5.5 million in extra cost.
During the first 38 weeks of operation, the new western DC operated at a slight loss ($0.6 million). However, much of these loss occurred in the early stages of operation when
most of the benefits of rapid delivery have not been realized. Assuming that no further
sales increase would take place, a full 52 weeks of operation after week 78 would result in
additional sales of $17 million (+$6.8 million in gross margin), as well as fulfillment cost
savings of at least $3.6 million (fulfillment cost savings from week 1-40 order count, adjusted
to 52 weeks). Thus, a conservative estimate for the annual net profit impact of the western
DC is an increase of $2.9 million. This is approximately 2.1% of the total annual net profit
for the retailer’s online store in 2012 ($141 million) or approximately 8.1% of the annual
net profit for the online store in 2012 across treated ZIP codes ($36 million).
The management team of the partner retailer was divided in their opinion on the profitability
of the new DC. While they believed that faster delivery would have a positive impact on
revenue, they were uncertain on whether this effect would be large enough to ever translate
into higher profits. This analysis indicates that the new DC operation became profitable
within a year of its opening. In addition, there is no evidence of demand cannibalization
between the online channel and the offline channel (see Section 2.5.3).
Even though this analysis is specific to this one particular retailer, the effects of delivery
speed on sales should be an important consideration for both online and multichannel
retailers. Table 14 is a list of top U.S. apparel retailers that appear to have limited scope
of online fulfillment capabilities in the years 2013-2015. We found that most major apparel
retailers operate at most three distribution centers, concentrated around the Midwestern
U.S. even to this day (Gap Inc. is a notable exception, operating six DCs across the United
States.). These fulfillment center location choice can be suboptimal if the objective is to
achieve fast deliveries to population centers, which tend to be located on the eastern or
western coast of the U.S. We believe that these retailers would likely benefit from adding
a second DC near population centers, or from enabling fulfillment through their brick and
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mortar stores.
Table 14: Distribution Centers of Select U.S. Apparel Retailers
Name
L Brands
Ascena Retail Group
Nordstrom
American Eagle Outfitters
Chico’s FAS
ANN Inc.
Ralph Lauren
J.Crew

DC(s) in 2013
OH
IA, IN, OH
IA
KS, PA
GA
KY
NC
NC, VA

DC(s) in 2015
OH
IN, OH
IA, PA
KS, PA
GA
KY
NC
NC, VA

2013 Sales ($mm)
6,910
4,670
3,040
2,960
2,580
2,480
2,450
2,390

Data from National Retail Federation (2014) and respective SEC filings.

2.5. The Mechanism of the Rapid Delivery Effect
In this section, we study the mechanism by which faster delivery leads to higher revenue and
present three main findings. First, we find that the observed sales increase is mainly due to
an increased order frequency among customers. Second, we find that more recently acquired
customers and frequent purchasers are more sensitive to improvement in the delivery speed.
This difference in customer response can be best explained by customers learning through
purchase experience. Third, we show that the observed sales increase did not affect physical
store sales of the partner retailer. Finally, we show that the rapid delivery effect is weaker
in ZIP codes with high retail store count, but can be stronger in ZIP codes with physical
stores operated by the same retailer.
2.5.1. Revenue Component Analysis
We first identify the revenue component that contribute the most to the observed revenue
increase in treated ZIP codes. There are three main revenue components that affect retailer
revenue in a given time period: (i) the total number of customers, (ii) the average order
count per customer, and (iii) the average basket size. The total revenue for a retailer in
a given time period would be the product of these revenue components. To analyze the
effect of faster delivery on each of these revenue components, we estimate Equation 2.4
with propensity score weighting using the respective revenue components as the dependent
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variable.
In the new specification, we define N EW CU STit , ORDERSit , and BASKETit as the
number of new customers, the order count, and the average basket size observed at ZIP
code i on week t respectively. A new customer is defined as a customer placing an online order for the first time with our partner retailer. We use panel Poisson regression
to estimate the models with N EW CU STit and ORDERSit as the dependent variable,
and generalized linear model with log link function and Gaussian errors to estimate the
model with BASKETit as the dependent variable. For the order count regression, we
further control for the effect of customer acquisition by introducing an additional covariP
ate T OT N EW CU STit = tj=1 N EW CU STij , which represents the cumulative number of
new customers acquired in ZIP code i by week t.
Table 15 shows the result from this set of regressions. For ease of presentation, only the
interaction term coefficient on T REATi · AF T ERW EEKt and the cumulative customer
acquisition effect coefficient on T OT N EW CU STit are included. The results show that in
the treated ZIP codes, the weekly new customer count increased at a rate that is 0.08% per
week faster than in the control ZIP codes following the opening of the western DC (column
1). They also show that order count in the treated ZIP codes increased at a rate that is
0.29% per week faster than in the control ZIP codes following the opening of the western
DC, controlling for the rate of online store adoption (column 2). Finally, they show that
the average basket size in treated ZIP codes increased a rate that is 0.07% per week faster
than in the control ZIP codes following the opening of the western DC (column 3). The
partner retailer does not price items differently across geographic regions.
While all three revenue components contribute to the overall revenue increase, the largest
contribution comes in the form of higher order count. The magnitude of these effects, in
actual terms, would be 2 additional customers and 40 additional orders each week across
the treated ZIP codes. The basket size increase is quite minimal (+8 cents per week, based
on average pre-treatment basket size of $113), but it suggests that these additional orders
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Table 15: The Impact of the Western DC on Revenue Components (All Customers)

T REAT · AF T ERW EEK

(1)
log(NEWCUST)
0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0001)

T OT N EW CU ST
Prop. score weight
Observations
Number of ZIP codes
Log-likelihood
AIC

Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−2.598 × 106
5.197 × 106

(2)
log(ORDERS)
0.0029∗∗∗
(0.00005)
0.0019∗∗∗
(0.00001)
Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−4.861 × 106
9.723 × 106

(3)
log(BASKET)
0.0007∗
(0.0043)

Yes
833,404
25,037
−1.043 × 107
2.086 × 107

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

p < 0.001

are not noticeably smaller compared to prior orders.
These results can be interpreted based on the initial assertion that every retail transaction
consists of two components: product and service. Faster deliveries will improve customer
valuation of the service component of each transaction, leading to higher order frequency
through better conversion rate (e.g. less online cart abandonment) and higher probability of
being chosen among competing retailers. We also speculate that this increased valuation of
the service component can also spill over into the product component, as demonstrated by
the increase in average basket size across the treatment ZIP codes. Behaviorally, the partner
retailers management team have also mentioned that customers have previously expressed
in survey responses that they dislike having orders in transit and would place a new order
only after they receive their last order. Finally, the minimal impact of faster delivery
on customer acquisition is not particularly surprising, given the lack of announcement or
advertising from the partner retailer regarding faster delivery.
2.5.2. Customer Order History, Frequency, and Learning
We now consider variation in the customer sensitivity to faster delivery. In particular, we
investigate if customers with longer history of online purchase with the retailer are more
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responsive to faster delivery than customers who started using the online store more recently.
We also examine if frequent purchasers are more responsive to faster delivery compared to
customers who do not purchase as often.
While the partner retailer did not provide specific customer level data, it provided aggregate
ZIP code level sales data for subsets of customers that satisfied certain conditions. The first
set of customers consists of customers whose first online order occurred before the beginning
of our observation period (i.e. before January 1, 2012). These customers are referred to
as existing customers. The second set of customers consists of customers whose first online
order occurred during our observation period. These customers are referred to as recent
customers.
The partner retailer also provided aggregate sales data on the subset of existing customers
based on their order frequency in 2011. The third set of customers is the subset of existing
customers who placed 12 or more orders in 2011. These customers are referred to as frequent
existing customers. Finally, the fourth set of customers is the subset of existing customers
who placed less than 12 orders in 2011. These customers are referred to as infrequent
existing customers 5 .
Table 16 shows the result of DiD regression (Equation 2.4) applied to each of the four customer segments. The effect of customer acquisition is controlled for in the recent customer
regression through the T OT N EW CU ST covariate as described in Section 2.5.1. The results show that recent customers are more sensitive to faster delivery compared to existing
customers. Among the existing customers, sensitivity to faster delivery is also positively
correlated with previous purchase frequency. The overall qualitative results hold when using order count as the dependent variable. There is no statistically significant effect on the
basket size.
5

The cut-off of 12 orders a year was chosen based on a metric called the 30-day repurchase rate, which
was one of the key recency metric tracked by the partner retailer. This metric tracks whether a customer’s
purchase was made within 30 days of the last purchase, so a customer that consistently satisfy this condition
would place at least 12 orders in a year on average.
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Table 16: The Revenue Impact of the Western DC (Recent vs Existing Customers)

T REAT · AF T ERW EEK
T OT N EW CU ST
Prop. score weight
Observations
Number of ZIP codes
Log-likelihood
AIC

log (SALES)
Existing
Frequent
0.0017∗∗∗
0.0022∗∗∗
(0.0004)
(0.0006)

Recent
0.0271∗∗∗
(0.0015)
0.0058∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−2.717 × 107
5.433 × 107

Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−3.187 × 107
6.374 × 107

Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−2.824 × 107
5.648 × 107

Infrequent
0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0004)

Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−3.001 × 107
6.001 × 107

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001

The results from the customer segment analysis is consistent with the main result in that
the segments that are the most likely to be treated with faster deliveries also display the
greatest sales increase. More recently acquired customers are more responsive to faster
delivery than existing customers since the latter group would have experienced more long
delivery times in the past. These track record of longer delivery time should make existing
customers slower to update their expectations based on just a few observations of shorter
delivery time. Consistent with this interpretation, frequent existing customers are more
responsive to faster delivery than infrequent existing customers, since the former group
would have more chance to observe faster deliveries than the latter group.
To support the notion that customers update their belief on the expected delivery time,
we conducted an online survey via Qualtrics. Participants (recruited online, not necessarily
customers of the partner retailer) were told that they had received four prior deliveries
from an online retailer with promised delivery time of 5-9 business days, and were given
the actual lead times they had experienced on those deliveries. Participants were assigned
with equal probability to one of two conditions, (7, 7, 7, 7) or (7, 7, 2, 2), where the numbers
indicate the actual delivery lead times in days. There were 93 and 107 participants in each
condition respectively. Participants were then asked to forecast the lead time for the next
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delivery, and were also asked how likely they would be to share the actual delivery time
information with their friends on a scale from 1 to 7 with 7 being extremely likely.
We found that the average forecasts of future delivery times were 6.1 days and 3.5 days
for the (7, 7, 7, 7) condition and the (7, 7, 2, 2) conditions respectively. The difference was
statistically significant at p < 0.001 level. We also found that the likeliness of sharing actual
delivery time information was 5.90 and 5.32 respectively. The difference was not statistically significant across conditions. These results support the claim that customers update
their delivery time expectation but with a certain amount of “stickiness.” In addition, there
are signs of word-of-mouth effect, in that customers would communicate delivery time information with each other, regardless of slow or fast delivery. Thus, even without explicit
announcement, customers still update their beliefs on delivery speed with each transaction
and communicate this information to other customers.
2.5.3. Interactions between Rapid Delivery and Offline Retail Channels
We now investigate interactions between faster delivery in the online channel and offline
retail channels. We first examine the impact of rapid delivery on the physical (B&M) stores
of the partner retailer. It is necessary to confirm that higher sales in the online store did not
result in lower sales in the B&M stores and that the observed sales increase in the online
store is a net positive effect.
There are total of 311 stores included in this analysis after excluding store openings and
closings6 . Physical stores are designated to the treatment group if they are located in a
treated ZIP code, and to the control group otherwise. Applying Equation 2.1 on the first
40 weeks of observation, we confirm that the validity of the parallel trends assumption
(δ3 = −0.0016, s.e. = 0.0022, t = −0.74). This allows the application of the DiD regression
using weekly sales data from the B&M stores.
Table 17 presents the result of estimating Equation 2.4 using the B&M store sales data,
6

The result is robust to including store openings and closings during the period of analysis.
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while Table 18 shows the result of estimating Equation 2.5 using the B&M sales data. In
both cases, the effect of the new western DC on western B&M store sales growth is estimated
to be statistically insignificant.
Table 17: The Revenue Impact of the Western DC on B&M Store Sales

T REAT · AF T ERW EEK
T REAT
AF T ERW EEK
Observations
Number of stores
Log-likelihood
AIC

log (SALES)
0.0008
(0.0006)
−0.0529∗∗∗
(0.0105)
0.0007
(0.0004)
24,258
311
−3.044 × 105
6.087 × 105

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table 18: The Revenue Impact of the Western DC on a B&M Store Sales (Distance DiD)

T REAT · AF T ERW EEK
T REAT · AF T ERW EEK · DIST
T REAT
AF T ERW EEK
DIST
T REAT · DIST
AF T ERW EEK · DIST
Observations
Number of stores
Log-likelihood
AIC
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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log (SALES)
0.0011
(0.0022)
0.0012
(0.0032)
0.1128∗∗
(0.0349)
0.0010
(0.0010)
0.3074∗∗∗
(0.0171)
−0.5405∗∗∗
(0.0522)
−0.0003
(0.0011)
24,258
311
−3.041 × 105
6.082 × 105

We also examine the interactions between the rapid delivery effect and ZIP code level offline
retail store density. In this analysis, there are two metrics of interest: the number of retail
stores in a ZIP code (RET COU N Ti , expressed in terms of hundreds), and the number of
the partner retailer’s B&M stores in a ZIP code (BM COU N Ti ).
We perform the triple DiD regression as shown in Equation 2.5, but with each retail store
count variable interacted with the treatment effect. We also perform the triple DiD regression with each of the revenue components shown in Section 2.5.1, controlling for the
effect of new customer acquisition when using order count as the dependent variable. Tables
19 and 20 show the estimation results for triple DiD regression with RET COU N Ti and
BM COU N Ti respectively. For ease of presentation, only the treatment effect, the triple
interaction effect, and the customer acquisition effect are shown in the tables.
Table 19: The Interaction between the Rapid Delivery Effect and Retail Store Count

T REAT · AF T ERW EEK
T REAT · AF T ERW EEK · RET COU N T

(1)
log(SALES)
0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0004)
−0.0002
(0.0003)

(2)
log(NEWCUST)
0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0001)
−0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0002)

Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−3.264 × 107
6.528 × 107

Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−2.591 × 106
5.182 × 106

T OT N EW CU ST
Prop. score weight
Observations
Number of ZIP codes
Log-likelihood
AIC

(3)
log(ORDERS)
0.0031∗∗∗
(0.0001)
−0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0001)
0.0019∗∗∗
(0.00001)
Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−4.851 × 106
9.701 × 106

(4)
log(BASKET)
0.0007
(0.0003)
−0.00004
(0.0004)

Yes
833,404
25,037
−1.043 × 107
2.086 × 107

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

The results show that the rapid delivery effect is weaker in ZIP codes with high retail store
count, although this difference is insignificant at the sales level when not controlling for the
cumulative effect of online store adoption. When a ZIP code has a high retail store count,
faster delivery results in less online store adoption and less order count growth compared
to a similar ZIP code with a lower retail store count.
The effect of B&M store presence on the strength of rapid delivery effect is more ambiguous.
On one hand, the results show that controlling for customer acquisition, local B&M presence

38

Table 20: The Interaction between the Rapid Delivery Effect and B&M Store Count

T REAT · AF T ERW EEK
T REAT · AF T ERW EEK · BM COU N T

(1)
log(SALES)
0.0012∗∗
(0.0004)
0.0006
(0.0008)

(2)
log(NEWCUST)
0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0001)
−0.0013∗∗
(0.0004)

Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−3.259 × 107
6.519 × 107

Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−2.598 × 106
5.196 × 106

T OT N EW CU ST
Prop. score weight
Observations
Number of ZIP codes
Log-likelihood
AIC

(3)
log(ORDERS)
0.0025∗∗∗
(0.0001)
0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0001)
0.0020∗∗∗
(0.00001)
Yes
1,952,886
25,037
−4.859 × 106
9.717 × 106

(4)
log(BASKET)
0.0007∗
(0.0003)
−0.0004
(0.0006)

Yes
833,404
25,037
−1.043 × 107
2.086 × 107

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

helps increase order count. However, local B&M presence also reduces effectiveness of
faster delivery in promoting online store adoption. Overall, the interaction is positive but
insignificant at the sales level when not controlling for the cumulative effect of online store
adoption.
These findings reveal a nuanced effect of faster delivery on customer behavior. In general,
the benefits of faster delivery is attenuated in locations with high offline store count, most
likely due to higher levels of local offline retail competition. This applies to both the rate of
online store adoption and order frequency. At the same time, having a local B&M presence
will increase the impact of faster delivery in terms of increasing order frequency but reduce
the impact of faster delivery in terms of online store adoption.
These results suggest that offline stores and online channel are substitutes in general, but
can be complements for existing customers when the offline stores and online channel are
operated by the same firm. These findings highlight the importance of establishing a fast,
reliable fulfillment networks for multichannel retailers since they stand to benefit the most
through faster delivery compared to retailers with only online channel.

39

2.6. Conclusion
There are very few academic works that study the relationship between delivery speed and
sales, despite the prominent role of deliveries in online retail. We fill the gap in the literature
by quantifying the sales impact of delivery speed and examining the underlying mechanism
behind the observed revenue increase. We use economic policy evaluation framework to
analyze a quasi-natural experiment that occurred as the result of a retailer’s decision to
open a new distribution center in the western U.S. This work is one of the first empirical
evidence on economic value of faster delivery in online retail.
Using difference-in-differences regression and regression discontinuity design, we show that
faster delivery resulted in a baseline revenue growth of 0.58% per week. We show that this
effect is inversely related to the distance to the new DC, decreasing at the rate of 0.23%
per week per 1,000 miles. The net profit effect of the new DC is conservatively estimated
to be +2.1% for the partner retailer.
In addition to providing an estimate on the magnitude of the rapid delivery effect, we
examine the underlying mechanism driving the observed revenue increase. We show that the
observed revenue increase is mainly driven by an increase in customer order frequency. We
also find that more recently acquired customers and frequent purchasers are more responsive
to an improvement in delivery speed. At the same time, infrequent purchasers and new
customers can also respond to an unannounced improvement in delivery speed. This is due
to customer learning, in which customers update their belief on expected delivery time and
communicate these information to peers.
We find that the rapid delivery effect is weaker in ZIP codes with high level of offline
competition (high retail store counts). However, we also find that the rapid delivery can be
stronger when there is an offline presence (a B&M store) by the same retailer. In addition,
there is no evidence that physical store sales were negatively affected when there is faster
delivery available. These results suggests that while offline stores and online stores act as
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substitutes in general, they can act as complements if the same firm operates both channels.
Finally, the impact of rapid delivery is a signal that retailers need speed to be competitive in
todays retail environment. How delivery speed affects different product categories remains
an open question. While this study shows that the value of delivery speed can be substantial
for fashion apparel products, it would be useful to understand customer response to rapid
delivery in other products. It is also worthwhile to consider to whether faster delivery by
a single firm can indirectly benefit its competitor by expanding the online retail market or
whether faster delivery only helps the firm expand its own market share.
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CHAPTER 3 : Maximizing Profitability in Online Retail through a Free Shipping
Threshold Policy
3.1. Introduction
Managing the cost of last-mile delivery has been an important profit concern for online
retailers. The issue has gained prominence in recent years as consumers continue to expect
free shipping despite the rising costs of transportation, technological investment, and labor.
As a result, most online retailers now adopt a free shipping threshold policy, which offers
free shipping on purchases that total more than a certain dollar amount (Stevens and Banjo
2014). The conventional wisdom is that this policy encourages customers to buy more with
a single order, improve traffic and conversion rates, and build brand loyalty (Lam 2014).
However, despite its widespread adoption, there is still a general lack of understanding on
how customers respond to a free shipping threshold policy, and its profit implication.
This leads to several concerns regarding the use of free shipping threshold. For starters,
there are no simple rules that can help determine the optimal free shipping threshold level.
Retailers in the same industry with similar product lines can offer a wide spectrum of free
shipping thresholds. For example, Banana Republic offers a $50 free shipping threshold,
while similar apparel retailers, like J. Crew and Ralph Lauren, offer free shipping thresholds
as high as $150 and $195 respectively. Some retailers like Nordstrom even offer free shipping
on all orders, essentially a free shipping threshold of $0. Given such large discrepancies, it
stands to reason that one of these free shipping thresholds should be better than others,
but without theoretical guidance it is unclear which one is the best.
It is also difficult for online retailers to learn through empirical approaches how customers
might respond to a new free shipping threshold. Free shipping thresholds are highly visible
and receive a lot of customer attention (Stynes 2015, Bensinger 2016). Given this degree
of scrutiny, running short-term randomized experiments (e.g. A/B testing) is often not a
realistic option. This means that data collection becomes very costly since most retailers
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are constrained to make only long-term changes to their free shipping threshold.
Finally, there is the fundamental problem of whether a free shipping threshold policy is
suitable for all online retailers. Online retailers hope to generate more sales by accepting
less shipping revenue, but this may not be a good proposition for some retailers. In addition
to the trade-off between higher sales and lower shipping revenue, retailers must also consider
the effect of free shipping thresholds on product return and customer stockpiling. It is also
unclear whether a lower free shipping threshold will lead to faster sales growth over the long
term. Thus, it is critical to develop a complete understanding of a free shipping threshold
policy’s profit implication and identify conditions that would make free shipping threshold
policy an effective tool for profit maximization.
In this chapter, we use transaction data from a leading U.S. apparel retailer to model the
effect of free shipping threshold on demand and product return. The key model assumptions
are motivated by various empirical observations in the data that reveal unusual customer
behavior in the presence of a free shipping threshold. Specifically, we incorporate the
observation that customers often act strategically to change their basket size to qualify
for free shipping in a practice known as “order padding”. In addition to demand, this
behavior affects the product return probability and the dollar value of products returned in
a significant manner.
We develop three models: customer demand model, product return probability model, and
the product return amount model. We propose a demand generation mechanism where
customers can pad their orders when their initial basket size is below the free shipping
threshold. Customers may then return some portion of their order, and this probability
is modeled as a function of the final basket size, free shipping status, and order padding
status. The product return amount, conditional on the event of a product return, is also
modeled as a function of the final basket size, free shipping status, and order padding status.
The online retailer’s problem is to determine the optimal free shipping threshold level to
maximize its expected total profit over a fixed time horizon. The retailer can levy shipping
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fees only from customers who do not qualify for free shipping and the retailer incurs a fixed
fulfillment cost for each order.
We also outline a procedure for integrating these models and estimating model parameters.
The model builds upon data that are readily available for most retailers and requires observations from at most two different non-zero finite free shipping thresholds (observation
from only one threshold is needed when the free shipping threshold is sufficiently large).
Thus, online retailers can easily apply the model to their own data to identify their profit
maximizing free shipping thresholds without having to run experiments at numerous levels
of free shipping thresholds.
We apply this methodology to the partner retailer’s data and find significant profit impact
of the free shipping threshold decision. The models show that the retailer’s decision to
reduce the free shipping threshold to one-third of the original level resulted in an 18.9%
decrease in profit per order and a 19.6% decrease in profit per dollar sales. There is also
no evidence that the lower free shipping threshold resulted in higher order incidence both
in the short term or in the long term. Additional analyses confirm that the retailer would
not benefit from the use of free shipping threshold.
Finally, we analyze the model to identify conditions under which a free shipping threshold
policy would help maximize retailer profit. We find that a free shipping threshold policy
is effective in maximizing profit when (i) the retailer has a high gross margin, (ii) the
retailer’s shipping fee is low, (iii) the probability of product return (or the cost of handling
a product return) is low, and (iv) order padding does not cause customers to delay their
future purchases.
3.1.1. Related Literature
The free shipping threshold optimization problem is a special type of quantity discount
problem, which has been studied extensively in the operations literature. Dolan (1987) and
Munson and Rosenblatt (1998) provide general reviews on early works with deterministic
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demands in a single-period setting. Recent research, such as works by Altintas et al. (2008)
and Lu et al. (2014), extends these results to stochastic demand and multi-period setting.
We investigate a special type of discount structure where the discount is applied to the
fixed cost rather than the unit cost, as is typical in a traditional quantity discount policy.
In this regard, the free shipping threshold problem is similar to the setting of Moinzadeh
and Nahmias (2000), who study minimum-purchase commitment contracts under two-part
tariff schemes.
Discounting on the fixed cost allows us to view a free shipping threshold policy as a price
partitioning mechanism as well (Gümüş et al. 2013). Price partitioning has been known
to affect customer preferences through behavioral mechanisms (Bertini and Wathieu 2008),
and we observe large threshold effect elicited by the presence of a free shipping threshold.
The behavioral mechanisms behind this effect include mental accounting (Thaler 1985),
framing effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1985), and reference point dependence (Heath et al.
1995, Dholakia and Simonson 2005). The work by Shampanier et al. (2007) is particularly
relevant to our setting, as they demonstrate that consumers pay disproportionate attention
to the option with zero price.
Two papers specifically study free shipping policies in online retail. Lewis et al. (2006) is
the first paper to examine the effect of shipping thresholds on order incidence and basket
size. The authors develop an ordered logit model of purchase incidence using online grocery
retail data. They classify orders as small ($0-$50), medium ($50-$75), or large (more than
$75) and show that reducing shipping fees or offering free shipping for each order group can
help increase purchase incidence. They also show that offering free shipping only on large
orders increases average basket size but ultimately is unprofitable.
Leng and Becerril-Arreola (2010) study the joint optimization of free shipping thresholds
and product pricing in online retail. They develop a demand model in which consumers
maximize utility by optimizing purchase quantity decisions from a basket of n products.
The retailer then determines the optimal free shipping threshold and profit margin. The
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model confirms the finding of Lewis et al. (2006) and shows that a free shipping threshold
can be effective in getting customers to generate larger orders. The authors analyze several
numerical examples, including a simulation analysis on the duopoly Nash equilibrium case.
This chapter focuses on the effect of shifting the free shipping threshold itself rather than
evaluating the impact of shipping fees at pre-defined thresholds. This approach allows
the evaluation of the profit impact of an arbitrary free shipping threshold. It also allows
free shipping threshold policy to be discussed in a more general manner by investigating
the detailed mechanism through which free shipping thresholds affect retailer profit. We
take an engineering approach, which results in a simple, tractable model with low data
requirements and straightforward estimation procedures. In contrast, the model by Leng
and Becerril-Arreola (2010) requires utility parameters to be estimated for every product,
which can be challenging for retailers with large product assortments or limited free shipping
threshold observations.
We contribute to the understanding of the role of a free shipping threshold policy in online
retail by developing a demand model and product return models based on actual customer
responses to various levels of free shipping thresholds. We outline a procedure by which
online retailers can apply the model in practice. Since the data requirement for our model
is very low, retailers can estimate key model parameters and obtain robust results by leveraging existing data. Finally, we provide a general commentary on the role of free shipping
threshold policies in online retail. We describe the conditions under which a free shipping
threshold policy can help maximize profit and the types of retailers that can benefit from
adopting such a policy.

3.2. Empirical Evidences
We first investigate empirical properties of customer transaction and product return data
under the presence of a free shipping threshold. The data reveal two major effects of a free
shipping threshold policy. First, the distribution of basket size can change significantly as
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customers use the free shipping threshold as a quantity target to qualify for free shipping
status. We refer to this behavior as order padding. Second, customer product return
pattern is affected as order padding leads to a higher probability of product return but
a lower fraction of orders returned. We use these observations as the basis of our model
assumptions in Section 3.3.
3.2.1. Customer Transaction Data
We obtained transaction level sales and product return data from a major U.S. apparel
retailer from January through March 2011 (2011 Q1) and from January through March
2012 (2012 Q1). The data is organized by the timestamp of each transaction, the dollar
amount of purchase, and the dollar amount of the items returned. No customer level data
or demographic data were included. Orders with basket size above $500, corresponding to
the 99.4 percentile basket size, were excluded.
In 2011, the retailer offered a free shipping threshold1 at $x, which was then lowered to $x/3
in September 2011. The original free shipping threshold was approximately twice average
basket size in 2011 Q1. Figure 2a shows the distribution of the basket size (in dollars) in
2011 Q1 and Figure 2b shows the basket size distribution in 2012 Q1.
The basket size distributions are clearly bimodal. Between 2011 Q1 and 2012 Q1, the basket
size distribution changed significantly but with the second basket size peak occurring just
above the respective free shipping thresholds. These figures point to the fact that customers
are strategically increasing their basket size to qualify for free shipping. By providing a free
shipping threshold, the retailer creates a salient reference point of basket sizes. At the same
time, the free shipping threshold also creates economic incentives for customers to increase
their basket size to avoid paying shipping fees. For example, consider a customer who is
about to purchase $95 worth of items from a retailer that charges a $10 shipping fee but
offers free shipping for orders that exceed $100. In this case, the customer can reduce the
total price of the order by adding a small item between $5 and $10 to their basket, even if
1

To preserve confidentiality, the free shipping threshold levels cannot be revealed.
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(a) 2011 Q1

(b) 2012 Q1

Figure 2: Basket Size Distribution
that item is valueless to the customer.
The retailer originally was unaware of this change in their basket size distribution, since
the average basket size changed by only $1.56 between 2011 Q1 and 2012 Q1. However,
a closer look at the transaction data reveals that there was a large shift in customers’
ordering behavior due to the change in free shipping threshold, which was not captured by
an aggregate statistic.
3.2.2. Product Return Data
Using the same data, we examine how a free shipping threshold affects product return
behavior. We consider two aspects of product return: the likelihood of a product return
taking place (return probability) and the dollar amount of items returned (return amount).
The orders are first grouped according to their basket size, to the nearest dollar amount.
For each group, we compute the average probability of product return (the event that at
least one item from an order is returned), and the average dollar amount of items returned
conditional on a return. As shown in Figures 3a and 3b, return probability is linear with
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respect to original basket size with a small jump in return probability at the free shipping
threshold. As shown in Figures 4a and 4b, return amount also is linear with respect to
original basket size.
(b) 2012 Q1

(a) 2011 Q1

Figure 3: Return Probability vs Original Basket Size
(b) 2012 Q1

(a) 2011 Q1

Figure 4: Return Amount vs Original Basket Size
The magnitude of these effects can be quantified through linear regression. For the return
probability, we estimate the following linear probability model:

Yi = γ0 + γ1 Di + γ2 Fi + i .

(3.1)

Here, Yi is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if some portion of order i has been returned
and 0 otherwise. Di is the original basket size in dollars for order i. Fi is a binary variable
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that is equal to 1 if order i qualified for free shipping and 0 otherwise.
For the return amount, we estimate a similar linear model:

Ri = (ρ1 + ρ2 Fi )Di + i .

(3.2)

Here, Ri is the dollar amount of items returned from order i. The regression is conditional
on Ri > 0, and the intercept is forced to zero.
Table 21 shows the estimates from the two regressions using each of 2011 Q1 data and 2012
Q2 data. The results show that when an order qualifies for free shipping, there is an increase
in the return probability (γ2 > 0) but a decrease in the return amount (ρ2 < 0). It can be
shown that this effect is mostly driven by order padding, which causes customers to return
smaller items more often (details are provided in in Section 3.4.1). The estimates for γ1 and
ρ1 , which represent the marginal effect of basket size on product return, are robust across
both periods. The base return probability γ0 decreased between 2011 Q1 and 2012 Q1 but
this change can be attributed to improvements in overall product quality and differences in
product assortment.
Figure 5 shows that the return proportion variance is stable with respect to the original
basket size for the most part. There is a slight increase in the return proportion variance
past $300 basket size (the 98th percentile order), but the return amount regression can be
performed using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Note that the estimates for the
return amount model is unbiased even in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Using robust
standard errors, it can be shown that the estimates ρ1 is still statistically significant. Thus,
it can be assumed that the return amount, conditional on the event of a return, is on average
a fixed proportion of the original basket size.
The effect of free shipping thresholds on product return behavior has not been addressed
in the literature. Product return is a common occurrence in online retail that involves
significant operational burden. A higher return probability can become problematic when
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Table 21: Product Return Regression Estimates

Return probability

γ0
γ1
γ2

Return amount

R2
N
ρ1
ρ2
R2
N

∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

2011 Q1 (τ = x)
0.050∗∗∗
(8.7 × 10−4 )
6.2 × 10−4∗∗∗
(1.0 × 10−5 )
0.060∗∗∗
(1.9 × 10−3 )
0.040
334,931
0.585∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.054∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.780
38,714

2012 Q1 (τ = x/3)
0.018∗∗∗
(1.2 × 10−3 )
6.8 × 10−4∗∗∗
(8.3 × 10−6 )
0.037∗∗∗
(1.2 × 10−3 )
0.026
346,732
0.584∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.010∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.7873
36,548

p < 0.001

Standard errors in parentheses

(b) 2012 Q1

(a) 2011 Q1

Figure 5: Variance of the Return Proportion vs Original Basket Size
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the online retailer offers a free return policy as is the case with the partner retailer. Thus,
a product return model plays an important role in evaluating the full profit implications of
a free shipping threshold policy.

3.3. Model
We now outline a customer demand model and a product return model that incorporate
empirical observations from Section 3.2. In the demand model, order padding is the primary
mechanism through which customers respond to the presence of a free shipping threshold.
In the product return models, the return probability and return amount will vary depending
on basket size, free shipping status, and the order padding status. These models are then
integrated to derive the objective function for the online retailer.
3.3.1. Customer Demand Model
We begin by developing a customer demand model to describe the distribution of basket
sizes given free shipping threshold at τ dollars. The model needs to capture two features of
the economic incentive behind order padding. First, not all customers pad their orders. If a
customer intends to purchase a basket whose value far exceeds the free shipping threshold,
then there is no need for order padding. Second, customers whose basket size is slightly
below the free shipping threshold will have the strongest incentive to pad their orders. For
these customers, order padding is not only economically optimal, but also easier to execute
compared to customers who need to double their basket size to qualify for free shipping.
The following basket size generation mechanism is proposed to describe customer demand
given a free shipping threshold at τ dollars:
1. Upon arrival, a customer selects a random demand x (i.e. basket size) from an
initial distribution X ∼ F (·).
2. If the realized demand x ≥ τ , then the customer places an order of basket size x.
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3. If the realized demand x < τ , then the customer may choose to pad the order with
probability p(τ, x) = max(0, α − β(τ − x)), where α ∈ [0, 1] and β > 0 are constants.
4. If the customer pads the order, then the customer selects a random demand y from
a distribution Y ∼ G(·) and places an order of basket size τ + y.
5. If the customer does not pad the order, then the customer places an order of basket
size x and also pays the shipping fee.
The initial demand distribution X represents the distribution of basket size that the online
retailer would observe in the absence of a non-zero finite free shipping threshold (τ = 0 or
τ = ∞). The free shipping threshold τ separates the initial demand distribution X into
two regions. Sufficiently large orders from the upper tail of the distribution are unaffected,
while small orders from the lower tail have a probability of being padded. The probability
of order padding with a free shipping threshold τ and an initial demand x is represented
by p(τ, x) = max(0, α − β(τ − x)). α represents the baseline probability of order padding if
the initial demand is infinitesimally close to the free shipping threshold. This probability is
assumed to decay linearly at a rate β based on the distance between the initial basket size
x and the free shipping threshold τ . In the case of padding, customers will exceed the free
shipping threshold τ by a random amount Y , independent of the original demand x. Let
Dτ represent the resulting basket size distribution when the free shipping threshold is at
$τ . The expectation E[Dτ ] is the average basket size observed given free shipping threshold
τ and we denote this as function D(τ ):
Z
D(τ ) =

)
max(0,τ − α
β

0

Z

τ

xf (x)dx +




Z
p(τ, x)(τ + E[Y ]) + (1 − p(τ, x))x f (x)dx +

max(0,τ − α
)
β

∞

xf (x)dx.

(3.3)

τ

The first term in Equation 3.3 represents orders placed without padding because the initial
demand is too small compared to the free shipping threshold (step 5 of the basket size
generation mechanism). The second term represents orders in the region where padding will
take place. Given a free shipping threshold at $τ and initial demand x, order padding will
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occur with probability p(τ, x) = max(0, α−β(τ −x)) (step 3). If there is order padding, then
the expected basket size is τ + E[Y ] (step 4). If there is no order padding, with probability
1 − p(τ, x), then the basket size is still x (step 5). The third term represents orders that will
be placed without padding because the initial demand exceeds the free shipping threshold
τ (step 2).
The average basket size function can be rearranged in terms of E[X] (expected basket
size without any free shipping threshold) plus the increase in the basket size due to order padding. D(τ ) can be expressed analytically if the distribution X has a closed-form
conditional moment expression (Kim 2010).

D(τ ) =







 E[X] + F (τ ) (α − βτ ) τ + E[Y ] − E[X|X ≤ τ ]











 + β (τ + E[Y ])E[X|X ≤ τ ] − E[X 2 |X ≤ τ ] .

if τ −






α
α


E[X]
+
F
(τ
)
−
F
(τ
−
)
(α − βτ ) τ + E[Y ] − E[X|τ −
≤ X ≤ τ]


β
β







α
α



≤ X ≤ τ ] − E[X 2 |τ −
≤ X ≤ τ] .
+ β (τ + E[Y ])E[X|τ −
β
β

if τ −

α
β

<0

(3.4)
α
β

≥0

The basket size distribution given τ also determines the amount of revenue generated
through shipping fees. The shipping revenue is modeled in terms of the fraction of fulfillment
cost that the online retailer can levy from customers. The fulfillment cost is assumed to be
a constant Kship > 0 representing the cost to fulfill a typical order in terms of weight (i.e.
changes in basket size will not significantly affect the fulfillment cost). The constant can
also include facility and labor costs in addition to the cost of shipping. The online retailer
is able to pass on a fixed proportion of its fulfillment cost φ ∈ [0, 1] to customers as shipping
fees. Thus, the online retailer generates φKship dollars of revenue through a shipping fee
for each order that does not qualify for the free shipping threshold. Let R(τ ) represent
the expected shipping revenue from an order given free shipping threshold τ . Based on the
customer demand model, R(τ ) is:
Z
R(τ ) = φKship

)
max(0,τ − α
β

Z

τ

f (x)dx +
max(0,τ − α
)
β

0
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1 − p(τ, x) f (x)dx .

(3.5)

In the above expression, the terms in the square bracket correspond to the probability that
a given order does not qualify for free shipping. The first term represents the case where
order padding does not take place because initial demand is too small, while the second
term represents the case where the customer chooses not to pad an order with probability
1 − p(τ, x). R(τ ) can be expressed analytically if the distribution X has a closed-form
conditional moment expression.
The constant fulfillment cost assumption is based on the observation that online retail
fulfillment typically is a high fixed cost, low variable cost operation (Acimovic and Graves
2014). This model can be modified to handle variable shipping costs by adjusting the gross
margin parameter in the objective function described in Section 3.3.3. Finally, the online
retailer is assumed to operate only one centralized distribution center to avoid split shipment
consideration.
3.3.2. Product Return Model
We now develop a model of product return behavior under the presence of a free shipping
threshold. Based on the product return regressions in Section 3.2.2, we propose a two-stage
model of product return. After receiving an order, a customer first decides whether to
return any part of the order (return probability model). Once a customer decides to return
some part of the order, then the customer will return a fixed proportion of the order (return
amount model).
In the first stage of the product return model, product return will be generated with some
probability that depends on the basket size, the free shipping status, and the order padding
status. Given an order i with basket size xi , customers will return this order with the
following probability:

min γ0 + γ1 xi +

γ2large

· 1{xi ≥τ } · (1 − IsPaddedi ) +

γ2pad


· IsPaddedi , 1 .

(3.6)

The constant γ0 ∈ [0, 1] is the base rate of return, γ1 > 0 is the marginal increase in the
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return probability for each additional dollar of demand, γ2large ≥ −γ0 − γ1 τ is the change in
return probability when order i exceeds the free shipping threshold without padding, and
γ2pad ≥ −γ0 − γ1 τ is the change in return probability when order i is padded.
In the second stage of the product return model, customers return a fixed portion of the
original order. When there is product return on order i with basket size xi , the online
retailer incurs the following product return cost:

M ρ1 +

ρlarge
2

· 1{xi ≥τ } · (1 − IsPaddedi ) +

ρpad
2


· IsPaddedi xi + Kret .

(3.7)

Here, M ∈ (0, 1)) is the average gross margin rate for the retailer and Kret > 0 is the
reverse logistics cost of a product return. The constant ρ1 ∈ [0, 1] is the base proportion of
≥ −ρ1 is the change in return proportion when order i exceeds the
product return, ρlarge
2
free shipping threshold without padding, and ρpad
≥ −ρ1 is the change in return proportion
2
when order i is padded.
The product return cost consists of the lost margin on that part of the order returned and
the logistics cost involved in shipping the product back to the warehouse (including labor
etc.). For simplicity, we assume that the online retailer offers free return policy and that
K = Kship = Kret . The main result will remain the same even when the online retailer
does not offer free return policy and charges some fraction of Kret from its customers on
the event of return. Product return is a strictly negative outcome for an online retailer (due
to the lost margin) and varying the fixed cost of return will not impact the general results
described in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. The return probability and return proportion may vary if
the order qualifies for free shipping. This change in return probability and proportion can
also vary between different avenues of qualifying for free shipping (via large initial demand
and order padding).
Let Q(τ ) denote the expected cost of product return when the free shipping threshold is at τ
dollars. For simplicity, the domain of τ is assumed to be on the interval [0,
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1−γ0 −max(γ2large ,γ2pad )
].
γ1

The two-stage product return mechanism is combined with the customer demand model to
obtain:
Z
Q(τ ) =

max(0,τ − α )
β

(ρ1 M x + K)(γ0 + γ1 x)f (x)dx

0

Z
+

τ

max(0,τ − α )
β

pad
1−γ0 −γ2
−τ
γ1


Z
p(τ, x)
0

Z
+

Z
+

τ

max(0,τ − α )
β

+

∞
pad
1−γ0 −γ2
−τ
γ1



pad

(ρ1 + ρ2



)M (τ + v) + K g(v)dv f (x)dx

(3.8)



(1 − p(τ, x))(ρ1 M x + K)(γ0 + γ1 x) f (x)dx

large
1−γ0 −γ2
γ1

Z



pad
pad
(ρ1 + ρ2 )M (τ + v) + K (γ0 + γ1 (τ + v) + γ2 )g(v)dv



large

(ρ1 + ρ2


large
)M x + K (γ0 + γ1 x + γ2
)f (x)dx

τ

Z
+

∞
large
1−γ0 −γ2
γ1



large
)M x + K f (x)dx.
(ρ1 + ρ2

The first term corresponds to the product return cost for orders whose demand is sufficiently small such that order padding will not take place. The second term corresponds
to the product return cost for orders involving order padding. Given order padding, the
return probability changes by γ2pad and the return proportion will also change by ρpad
2 . The
third term corresponds to the product return cost when order padding does not take place.
Finally, the fourth and last term corresponds to the product return cost for orders qualifying for free shipping due to sufficiently large initial demand (greater than the free shipping
threshold τ ) so that there is no incentive for order padding. In this case, the return probability changes by γ2large and the return proportion changes by ρlarge
. Q(τ ) can be expressed
2
analytically if the distribution X has a closed-form conditional moment expression.
3.3.3. The Online Retailer’s Objective Function
The online retailer’s objective is to determine the free shipping threshold that maximizes
its expected total profit over a fixed time horizon (month, quarter, year etc.). We show that
the online retailer needs to consider two metrics: expected profit per order and expected
profit per dollar sales. The effect of order padding on future sales will determine the relative
importance of these two metrics.
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The retailer’s objective is to maximize the total profit over a given time horizon, which can
be broken down as the product of the retailer’s total sales over that time horizon and the
expected profit per dollar sales (i.e. the operating margin). The expected profit per dollar
sales can be expressed through the customer demand model and product return model
outlined earlier. Let M ∈ (0, 1) represent the average gross margin rate for the online
retailer. Given a free shipping threshold τ , an average order generates gross margin of
M D(τ ) and shipping revenue of R(τ ). The fulfillment cost is K and the expected return
cost is Q(τ ). Thus, the expected profit per dollar sales given free shipping threshold τ is:
Π(τ )
D(τ )
M D(τ ) + R(τ ) − K − Q(τ )
=
.
D(τ )

Expected Profit Per Dollar Sales =

(3.9)

In the above expression, Π(τ ) = M D(τ ) + R(τ ) − K − Q(τ ) is the expected profit per order
given free shipping threshold τ .
The total sales over a given time horizon, S(τ ), can be expressed by decomposing it as the
product of the number of orders generated over a given period and the expected basket
size per order, denoted by N (τ ) and D(τ ) respectively. Since D(τ ), the average basket size
function, is described in Section 3.3.1, the focus here is on N (τ ), which captures the effect
of a free shipping threshold on the number of orders that customers place in a given time
period.
There are two possible extreme cases for the N (τ ) function. In one extreme, N (τ ) is equal
to a constant N0 > 0. In this scenario, the number of orders placed by customers in a given
time period is completely inelastic with respect to changes in the free shipping threshold.
In another extreme, S(τ ) is equal to a constant S0 > 0 such that N (τ ) =

S0
D(τ ) .

In this

scenario, the number of orders placed by customers in a given time period is fully elastic
with respect to changes in the free shipping threshold.
These two cases can be interpreted in terms of how customers shift their purchase timing
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after order padding. The former case corresponds to the case where customers do not shift
their purchase timing at all after order padding. The number of orders in a given time period
remains the same, hence only changes in the average basket size will affect the total sales
during the same time period. The latter case corresponds to the case where customers shift
their purchase timing in response to the free shipping threshold. Order padding represents
early consumption of future demand, and the total sales will remain constant even when
there is a change in the free shipping threshold.
In reality, a particular retailer would experience a response somewhere between these extremes. Some customers will shift their purchase timing after order padding, while others
will not. The product type and assortment offered by the retailer can also factor into customers’ decisions to shift their purchase timing. A parameter η ∈ [0, 1] is used to represent
the propensity of customers to shift their purchase timing after order padding. When η = 1,
customers always shift their purchase timing and order padding is equivalent to the early
consumption of future demand. On the other hand, when η = 0, customers never shift their
purchase timing and order padding represents pure extra sales. The retailer’s total sales
over a given time horizon can be expressed as:


S(τ ) = ηS0 + (1 − η) N0 · D(τ ) .

(3.10)

Combining Equations 3.9 and 3.10, the online retailer’s objective function is:

Total Profit = ηS0 ·


Π(τ )
+ (1 − η) N0 · Π(τ ) .
D(τ )

(3.11)

Equation 3.11 shows that there are two key profit metrics that are important to the online
retailer: the expected profit per dollar sales and the expected profit per order. When η
is close to 1 and order padding directly leads to shifts in customers’ purchase timing, the
retailer needs to focus on maximizing the expected profit per dollar sales (i.e. the operating
margin). When η is close to 0 and order padding is unlikely to affect future purchase timing,

59

the retailer needs to focus on maximizing the expected profit per order. For intermediate
cases, a convex combination of these two metrics will determine the total profit for the
online retailer.
3.3.4. Model Discussion
We complete the model development by discussing several key model assumptions. One
important assumption is that a free shipping threshold policy affects total sales only through
order padding and purchase timing adjustment. This assumption implies that customer
demand will be the same even if the retailer chooses to adopt a free shipping threshold at
τ = 0. However, it is reasonable to believe that sales may increase substantially when a
free shipping threshold is lowered aggressively (assuming no change in product pricing) so
that the optimal free shipping threshold would differ from our model recommendation.
In Section 3.4.2, we examine the short-term effect of promotions involving lower free shipping
thresholds and the long-term effect of the partner retailer’s free shipping threshold reduction
in late 2011. We find that offering a lower free shipping threshold did not improve total
sales or total order count in a statistically significant way, both in the short term and in
the long term. This suggests that the prevailing notion of lower free shipping thresholds
leading to more sales may be overstated.
There are also no competition effects in our model, since the data is based on observations
from just one retailer. At the same time, comparing objective values between the optimal
τ ∗ and other points in the domain will provide insight on the magnitude of competitive
effects that would justify deviation from the optimal threshold recommended by the model.
In Section 3.4.2, we also show that such competitive effect must be very large to deviate
from the model recommendation by a significant amount. For example, suppose that the
partner retailer was concerned about a competitor offering free shipping on all orders. The
model indicates that it would not be economical to match the competitor’s free shipping
threshold unless our partner retailer expects its order count to increase by more than 50%
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by matching τ = 0.
Finally, we treat factors such as product pricing, shipping revenue parameter φ, and return
policy as exogenous conditions. In reality, all of these are decision variables, and an online
retailer may wish to jointly optimize a combination of these parameters. While we do
not explicitly optimize around these parameters, we discuss the relationship between these
factors and the effectiveness of a free shipping threshold policies in Section 3.5.2. We show
that a free shipping threshold policy is more effective with a higher gross margin rate M
(i.e. higher prices) and lower shipping revenue parameter φ (i.e. lower shipping fee). We
also conjecture that a more lenient return policy would lead to more order padding, thus
increasing the effectiveness of free shipping threshold in generating more sales but would
also increase product return probability.

3.4. Free Shipping Threshold Optimization
In this section, we apply the models to actual transaction and product return data provided
by the partner retailer, described in Section 3.2, to estimate the model parameters. These
estimates are then used to determine the optimal free shipping threshold for the partner
retailer and to demonstrate the outsize impact of free shipping thresholds on online retailer
profit.
3.4.1. Parameter Estimation and Model Validation
We use transaction and product return data from January-March 2011 (2011 Q1) and
January-March 2012 (2012 Q1) for the estimation. In 2011 Q1, the retailer offered standard
free shipping threshold at $x, which was then permanently lowered to $x/3 in September
2011. The same quarters from 2011 and 2012 are chosen to control for seasonality in fashion
retail, particularly in terms of product assortment. We also focus on the first quarter as
the main observation period to avoid major retail promotion events that occur throughout
the remainder of a calendar year.
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We assume a gamma distributed initial demand distribution X ∼ F (x; k1 , θ1 ) and a gamma
distributed post-padding demand distribution Y ∼ G(y; k2 , θ2 ). Given a sequence of observed basket size and corresponding free shipping threshold {di , τi }, we estimate the shape
and scale parameters (k1 , θ1 , k2 , θ2 ) of the demand distributions, as well as the order
padding parameters α and β, through maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Orders with
basket size greater than $500, which is the 99.4 percentile basket size, are excluded. The
likelihood function is:

L(θ|d) =

X


Z

f (di ) 1 − p(τ, di ) · 1{di <τi } + f (di ) + g(di − τ )

τ

max(0,τ − α
)
β

i



p(τ, x)f (x)dx · 1{di ≥τi } .

(3.12)

In this likelihood function, the first term in the square bracket corresponds to an observation
with basket size di that is below the corresponding free shipping threshold τi . These orders
can only come from the initial demand distribution X when the customer decides not to pad
the order. The probability of observing such orders is the product of the density at basket
size di and the probability of no order padding 1 − p(τi , di ). The second term in the square
bracket corresponds to an observation with basket size di that is above the corresponding
free shipping threshold τi . This order can come either from the initial demand distribution
or from order padding. The likelihood of the first case is simply the density at demand di .
The second case is the density of the post-padding demand at g(di − τ ) multiplied by the
probability of order padding.
While observations from two different free shipping thresholds are used to perform the MLE,
parameter estimation is possible with observations from just a single free shipping threshold
when it is sufficiently large (i.e. τ > α/β). This condition is usually satisfied when the free
shipping threshold is greater than the average observed basket size. In general, the retailer
requires observations from at most two different non-zero finite free shipping thresholds for
MLE. A more detailed discussion on this issue is provided in Section 3.4.3.
Table 22 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of customer demand model parameters,
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with k1 = 1.76, θ1 = 46.79, k2 = 1.82, θ2 = 4.83, α = 0.609, and β = 0.0075. Based on these
estimates, the average basket size from the initial demand is shown to be E[X] = k1 θ1 =
$82.35. In addition, customers add E[Y ] = k2 θ2 = $8.79 past the free shipping threshold
on average when padding. Finally, customers pad their orders with 60.9% probability near
the free shipping threshold. This probability then decreases at the rate of 0.75% per dollar
below the free shipping threshold.
Table 22: Customer Demand Model Parameter Estimates

k1
θ1
k2
θ2
α
β
Log-likelihood
AIC
N
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

Estimate
1.76∗∗∗
46.79∗∗∗
1.82∗∗∗
4.83∗∗∗
0.609∗∗∗
0.0075∗∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

Standard Deviation
0.003
0.090
0.012
0.046
0.002
0.00005
-3,582,072
7,164,155
681,663

p < 0.001

An interesting feature of these estimates is that α < 1, meaning that customers do not
always engage in order padding. This is rather surprising at first, especially since customers
can avoid paying the shipping fee by adding arbitrary items to their basket just to return
them later through the free return policy offered by the partner retailer. This indicates that
α < 1 and β > 0 estimates implicitly capture product search cost (looking for items when
padding) and product return friction (traveling to nearest courier locations).
Using these customer demand model estimates, we simulate 100,000 orders through the
order generation mechanism described in Section 3.3.1. Two simulation instances are generated: one instance using τ = $x and another using τ = $x/3. Figure 6a shows the actual
basket size distribution from the 2011 Q1 data and the basket size distribution from the
simulation using τ = $x. Figure 6b shows the actual basket size distribution from the 2012
Q1 data and the basket size distribution from the simulation using τ = $x/3.
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(a) 2011 Q1, τ = x

(b) 2012 Q1, τ = x/3

Figure 6: Empirical vs Simulated Basket Size Distribution
The customer demand model is able to capture most of the relevant empirical properties
observed in the actual data. Notably, it captures (i) a peak in the distribution immediately
above the free shipping threshold, and (ii) a drop in the distribution immediately below the
free shipping threshold.
The product return parameters are chosen based on the regressions in Section 3.2.2. We will
use the average of 2011 Q1 and 2012 Q1 estimates shown in Table 21 so that γ0 = 0.034,
γ1 = 0.00065, and ρ1 = 0.584. However, parameters γ2 and ρ2 , representing the effects of
free shipping on product return, need to be estimated more carefully. Since customers can
qualify for free shipping either through a large initial order or by order padding, γ2 and ρ2
reflect a mixture of parameters γ2large , γ2pad , ρlarge
and ρpad
2
2 .
The true effect of large initial basket size and order padding on product return can be
estimated using the customer demand model. Based on the model estimates from Table 22,
it can be seen that when τ = x (i.e. in 2011 Q1), 8.9% of orders qualified for free shipping
through order padding, while 13.1% of orders qualified for free shipping through initial order
size that exceeded τ = x. On the other hand, when τ = x/3 (i.e. in 2012), 16.3% of orders
qualified for free shipping through order padding, while 63.6% of orders qualified for free
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shipping through initial order size that exceeded τ = x/3. Using the relative proportion of
orders that qualified for free shipping through order padding and large initial basket size,
one can set up a system of equations whose solution corresponds to the true effects of free
shipping on product return.
In the case of this particular retailer, when an order qualifies for free shipping through
large initial basket size, the order’s return probability increases by 1.4% and its return
proportion increases by 3.4%. In contrast, when an order qualifies for free shipping through
order padding, its return probability increases by 12.6% and its return proportion decreases
by 18.3%. These estimates show that order padding increases return likelihood but decrease
return amount. This is most likely because customers who engaged in order padding are
returning smaller items that were used to achieve order padding rather than the items they
originally planned to purchase.
3.4.2. Optimizing the Free Shipping Threshold Decision
Given the parameter estimates, we now optimize free shipping threshold for the partner
retailer. We use industry data to exogenously determine the fulfillment cost, shipping fee,
and average gross margin rate parameters. The cost of fulfillment is set to K = $10, which
includes the facility and labor costs per package. The shipping cost parameter φ = 1,
meaning that the online retailer passes through the entire fulfillment cost as shipping fee.
The average gross margin rate for the retailer is M = 0.4.
Figures 7-10 show functions D(τ ), Q(τ ), Π(τ ), and

Π(τ )
D(τ )

respectively. Given the domain

τ ∈ [0, 500], the maximum profit per order is $29.79, which is achieved at τ = 500. The
maximum profit per dollar sales is $0.362, which is achieved at τ = 500.
The free shipping threshold level significantly affects both the expected profit per order
and the expected profit per dollar sales. Table 23 shows the actual changes in these two
metrics after the online retailer lowered the free shipping threshold from τ = x to τ = x/3,
as well as the model predicted changes. For the purpose of this exercise, 2012 Q1 data is
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Figure 7: Expected Basket Size Function D(τ )

Figure 8: Expected Return Cost Function Q(τ )

Figure 9: Expected Profit Per Order Function Π(τ )
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Figure 10: Expected Profit Per Dollar Sales Π(τ )/D(τ )

excluded from estimation to better represent the condition under which the free shipping
policy change would have been evaluated. Based on estimates using only the 2011 Q1 data,
the model predicts that the profit per order would decrease from $28.5 to $23.1 (-18.9%)
and that the profit per dollar sales would decrease from 0.327 to 0.266 (-19.6%) if the free
shipping threshold was lowered to τ = x/3. In reality, the profit per order decreased by
20.8% and the profit per dollar sales decreased by 19.5%. As a reference, a naive model
that assumes no change in basket size distribution from 2011 Q1 and no effect of a free
shipping threshold on product return would have predicted profit per order to decrease by
only about $2.12 (-7.2%).
Table 23: Actual Change vs Model Prediction on the Effect of Lower Free Shipping Threshold

Average Basket Size
Expected Profit Per Order
Expected Profit Per Dollar Sales
∗ Model

2011,
Actual
$87.20
$29.52
$0.339

τ =x
Model
$87.10
$28.52
$0.327

2012, τ
Actual
$85.64
$23.37
$0.273

= x/3
Model
$88.01
$23.11
$0.263

estimated using 2011 Q1 data only, assuming γ2large = ρlarge
= 0.
2

The optimization shows that the partner retailer’s objective function is maximized at τ =
500. This is true for any value of η parameter, which defines the degree to which customers
adjust their purchase timing after order padding. In general, there may be a significant
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discrepancy between the free shipping threshold that maximizes the expected profit per
order and the free shipping threshold that maximizes the expected profit per dollar sales.
It is therefore important to be able to estimate η parameter for a particular retailer. This
estimation can be achieved by comparing order count in relation to average basket size
before and after a change in the free shipping threshold.
The effect of a lower free shipping threshold on total sales and total order count can be
studied by examining the retailer’s aggregate weekly U.S. sales data from January 2011 to
December 2012. For each week t, variable T REATt is defined to indicate whether the week
corresponded to the lower free shipping threshold period (i.e. after September 2011). There
were also weeks during which the retailer offered lower free shipping threshold promotions at
τ = x/3 (in early 2011) and τ = 0 (in late 2011 and in 2012). Dummy variables PromoLowt
and PromoFreet are used to indicate the weeks where free shipping promotion discounts
were offered at τ = x/3 and τ = 0 respectively. Log-linear sales growth is assumed with
week-of-the-year seasonality Wt . The effect of a lower free shipping threshold on weekly
order count can be estimated using the following model specification:

log(Order Countt ) = α1 t + α2 t · TREATt + α3 PromoLowt + α4 PromoFreet + Wt + t . (3.13)

Table 24 shows the results of the above regression. The first column shows the results with
weekly order count as the dependent variable. The second column shows the results with
weekly dollar sales as the dependent variable. Note that the weekly order count variable
acts as a proxy measure for the average duration between purchase for a typical customer.
There are two notable observations regarding the regression results. First, none of the
factors associated with lower free shipping threshold are statistically significant. This suggests that there is no evidence of short-term or long-term sales growth effect that can be
attributed to a lower free shipping threshold. Even if the sales boost from a lower free
shipping threshold is present, it is not strong enough to justify deviation from the model
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Table 24: The Effect of Lower Free Shipping Threshold on Sales

t
t · TREATt
PromoLowt
PromoFreet
R2
Number of Observations
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

Order Count
Estimate St. Dev.
0.005
0.003
-0.0006
0.0023
0.056
0.122
0.086
0.084
0.934
104

Total Sales
Estimate St. Dev.
0.007∗
0.003
-0.0026
0.0022
0.030
0.119
-0.023
0.082
0.925
104

p < 0.001

recommendation. For example, the PromoLowt coefficient can be used to argue that lowering the free shipping threshold from τ = x to τ = x/3 would increase the order count by
5.8% (this also requires a further assumption that the short-term sales boost would persist
in the long-term). However, this increase would still be insufficient to compensate for the
19-20% decrease in the overall profit that the partner retailer experienced. The estimates
on the effect of lower free shipping threshold also suggest that competitive dynamics may
not matter much in this particular scenario. The order count did not exhibit a statistically
significant increase, which suggest that the retailer was unable to attract significantly more
orders from its competitors despite offering a lower free shipping threshold.
Second, the results show that for this particular retailer η = 1. This is because the total
sales do not change across different free shipping thresholds even though a non-negligible
change in the average basket size is expected (-4.3% if the free shipping threshold is lowered
from τ = x to τ = 0). The average basket size decreased by 8.3% when τ = 0 in reality,
which almost perfectly explains the approximate increase in the order count suggested by
our regression (though this estimate is statistically insignificant). This observation further
validates the claim that η = 1 and is an indication that customers can shift their purchase
frequency based on their basket size.
The model may overestimate the average basket size at extremely low free shipping thresholds such as τ = 0. Extremely low free shipping thresholds may not be a very effective tool
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since they lead customers to place smaller orders without generating significantly more orders. Using the expected profit functions, a break-even analysis can be conducted in terms
of the amount of order count increase required to justify deviation from the optimal free
shipping threshold. Figure 11 shows the break-even analysis in the case of this particular
retailer, assuming η = 1.
Figure 11: Break-Even Analysis for Deviation from the Optimal Free Shipping Threshold
(τ ∗ = 500, η = 1)

The graph shows that deviation from the optimal free shipping threshold becomes much
more difficult to justify as τ approaches zero. Moving from τ = 500 to τ = 200 would
require the order count to increase 4.1% beyond our model assumptions, whereas moving
to τ = 50 would require the order count to increase 38.6% beyond the model assumption.
Moving to τ = 0 would further require the order count to increase by 54.9%. As a reference,
Lewis et al. (2006) estimates that in their case, moving from τ = 75 to τ = 0 would increase
order count by 11.6%.
Figures 12 and 13 show the sensitivity of the optimal expected profit per dollar sales to
padding parameter α and product return proportion parameter ρ1 . In the partner retailer’s
particular case, the optimal expected profit per dollar sales is not especially sensitive to the
parameter α but is quite sensitive to the parameter ρ1 . An interesting find is that higher
padding probability leads to lower expected profit per dollar sales in this case, since order
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padding leads to an increased probability of product return.
Figure 12: Sensitivity of the Optimal Expected Profit per Dollar Sales to the Padding
Parameter α

Figure 13: Sensitivity of the Optimal Expected Profit per Dollar Sales to the Product
Return Parameter ρ1

Finally, it is important to note that these parameter estimates are specific to the case of this
particular retailer. It is expected that parameters governing the order padding propensity
(α and β) and effects of padding on product return (γ2pad and ρpad
2 ) will differ considerably
across different retailers. However, the estimation procedure described in this chapter is
applicable to all online retailers and requires only the total basket size and return amount
of each transaction. While the model has been used to evaluate free shipping thresholds on
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the domain τ ∈ [0, 500], this model is most useful for evaluating “moderate” levels of free
shipping threshold changes (such as moving from τ = 200 to τ = 100 in this case).
3.4.3. Data Requirements for Model Estimation
One advantage of the models described in this chapter is that their parameters can be
estimated using only basket size, return amount, and order count data. It is also important
to note that observations from at most two non-zero finite free shipping threshold regimes
are needed to fully estimate parameters from all of our models (customer demand model,
product return model, and the parameter η). We now provide a more detailed discussion
on the data requirement for model estimation in this section.
The main challenge in estimation arises when the retailer has data from only one free
shipping threshold. However, if the free shipping threshold τ from which the data is obtained
exceeds α/β, where α and β are the true order padding parameters from the customer
demand model, then it is possible to estimate the full customer demand model parameters.
For the product return model parameters and η parameter, a full estimation will always
require observations from at least two non-zero finite free shipping thresholds. However, one
option for retailers with data limitation is to assume that γ2large = 0 and ρlarge
= 0, meaning
2
that only order padding would affect product return. This assumption should be reasonable
for certain retailers, and would allow estimation of γ2pad and ρpad
with observations from
2
just one free shipping threshold. The retailer can also assume η = 1, meaning customers
would always shift their purchase timing after order padding, to generate a conservative
estimate for the optimal free shipping threshold.
We illustrate these ideas by estimating model parameters using only 2011 Q1 data (with
τ = x). Table 25 shows the demand model parameter estimates using the 2011 Q1 data
only compared to using both 2011 Q1 and 2012 Q1 data. The magnitudes of key parameter estimates are consistent across both estimation. The 2011 Q1 only model also shows
good model fit when measured against both 2011 Q1 and 2012 Q1 empirical basket size
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distribution, as indicated by the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Table 25: Customer Demand Model Parameter Estimates

k1
θ1
k2
θ2
α
β
Log-likelihood
AIC
N
Kullback-Leibler (2011 Q1)
Kullback-Leibler (2012 Q1)
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

2011 Q1 Only
1.81∗∗∗
(0.004)
46.09∗∗∗
(0.103)
1.36∗∗∗
(0.017)
9.22∗∗∗
(0.135)
0.572∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.0072∗∗∗
(0.00014)
1,793,001
3,585,452
334,931
0.030
0.040

2011 Q1 & 2012 Q1
1.76∗∗∗
(0.003)
46.79∗∗∗
(0.090)
1.82∗∗∗
(0.012)
4.83∗∗∗
(0.046)
0.609∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.0075∗∗∗
(0.00005)
-3,582,072
7,164,155
681,663
0.031
0.029

p < 0.001

Standard errors in parentheses

Based on the product return regression and customer demand estimate using only 2011 Q1,
the effect of padding on product returns can be determined by assuming γ2large = 0 and
ρlarge
= 0. The effect of free shipping on return (γ2 = 0.06 and ρ2 = −0.054) can be divided
2
by the proportion of orders qualifying for free shipping due to order padding (38.4%). This
yields the estimates γ2large = 0.156 and ρpad
= −0.141. Figure 14 shows the expected profit
2
per dollar sales function (the objective function when η = 1) computed using 2011 Q1 data
only and the same function computed using both 2011 Q1 and 2012 Q1 data. The maximum
percentage error between these two functions is 1.63% (relative to the function computed
using both quarters) and occurs at τ = 0.
These results show that it is possible to obtain reasonable parameter estimates using observations from only one free shipping threshold. The caveat is that it is impossible to know
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Figure 14: Expected Profit Per Dollar Sales (2011 Q1 Only vs 2011 Q1 + 2012 Q1)
whether the free shipping threshold is sufficiently large (τ > α/β) a priori. However, a
good heuristic is to check if the τ is below the observed basket size. If τ is smaller than
the observed basket size, then it is likely that the retailer needs additional observations
from another free shipping threshold for customer demand model estimation. In such cases,
the recommendation is to set the second free shipping threshold to be greater than the
observed basket size. Since the expected profit per order maximizing τ ∗ is always greater
than arg max D(τ ) (assuming no product return, see Section 3.5.2 for details), this choice
of new free shipping threshold will likely help improve the retailer’s profits in addition to
obtaining additional data.
3.4.4. Discussion on the Model Selection Process
It is worthwhile to discuss the general model selection process. We compare the model fit
for four candidate models to show that having a linear decay in padding probability and
a secondary post-padding demand distribution significantly improves the model fit. The
candidate models are outlined below.
Order Padding Model (Secondary Demand Distribution) This is the model described in the paper with the following demand generation mechanism.
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1. Upon arrival, a customer selects a random demand x (i.e. basket size) from an
initial distribution X ∼ F (·).
2. If the realized demand x ≥ τ , then the customer places an order of basket size x.
3. If the realized demand x < τ , then the customer may choose to pad the order with
probability p(τ, x) = max(0, α − β(τ − x)), where α ∈ [0, 1] and β > 0 are constants.
4. If the customer pads the order, then the customer selects a random demand y from
another demand distribution Y ∼ G(·) and places an order of basket size τ + y.
5. If the customer does not pad the order, then the customer places an order of basket
size x.
Gamma Distribution Model We fit a single gamma distribution to the observed basket
size. Gamma distribution is commonly used to model simple demand distributions since
it yields positive demand and can have a fatter tail compared to the normal distribution.
This model is not expected to be able to capture the bimodal nature of the observed basket
size distribution, but is useful as a benchmark of model fit.
Gamma Distribution Mixture Model

This model is identical to the order padding

model used in the paper, except in step 3 of the order generation mechanism. This model
assumes that customers would pad their orders with constant probability α ∈ [0, 1] if their
initial demand is below the free shipping threshold τ . Given padding, customers would
place an order of size τ + Y where Y ∼ G(·). Otherwise, customers would place orders with
basket size X ∼ F (·) with probability 1 − α. Both X and Y are gamma distributed, and
are independent of each other. This model is similar to the order padding model used in
the paper, except that it does not assume a linear decay in padding probability.
Order Padding Model (Upper Tail Demand)

This model is identical to the order

padding model used in the paper, except in step 4 of the order generation mechanism. This
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model replaces the secondary post-padding demand distribution Y ∼ G(·) with the upper
tail of the demand distribution X above τ . Thus, given padding, customers select a random
demand x2 from the upper tail of the initial distribution F (·|x2 > τ ). This model is similar
to the order padding model used in the paper, except that it assumes a certain relationship
between the post-padding demand and the initial demand distribution X.
Parameters are estimated for each candidate model through maximum likelihood estimation
using transaction data from 2011 Q1 and 2012 Q1. The model fit for each candidate model is
then evaluated based on log-likelihood, AIC, and the basket size distribution fit with respect
to the empirical distribution observed in each of 2011 Q1 and 2012 Q1 periods. Note that
the free shipping threshold during 2011 was τ = x while the free shipping threshold during
2012 was τ = x/3. Kullback-Leibler divergence is used to evaluate the similarity between
the observed basket size histogram and the simulated basket size histogram generated by
each model. Table 26 shows the model fit for the four models presented above.
Table 26: Model Fit of Various Demand Models

Order Padding (Secondary Demand)
Gamma Distribution
Gamma Distribution Mixture
Order Padding (Upper Tail)

Log-likelihood

AIC

3,582,072
3,645,288
3,616,518
3,605,306

7,164,155
7,290,580
7,233,046
7,210,619

Kullback-Leibler Divergence
2011 Q1
2012 Q1
0.031
0.029
0.095
0.186
0.072
0.107
0.033
0.170

The results show that the order padding model with secondary post-padding demand (the
model used in the paper) shows the best fit in all three model fit criteria. This result
demonstrates that two components are critically important in explaining the observed basket
size. Specifically, the model needs to address that (i) customers are more likely to pad when
their initial order is closer to the free shipping threshold, and that (ii) post-padding demand
is determined by a secondary demand distribution that is unrelated from the initial order
distribution.
As an example, Figure 15 shows the empirical vs simulated basket size distribution histogram for the order padding model with secondary demand distribution while Figure 16
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shows the histogram for the order padding model with upper tail demand. Consistent with
the Kullback-Leibler divergence, the former model shows better fit visually for both 2011
Q1 and 2012 Q1 data.
(b) 2012 Q1

(a) 2011 Q1

Figure 15: Basket Size Histogram Model Fit (Order Padding Model with Secondary Demand)
(a) 2011 Q1

(b) 2012 Q1

Figure 16: Basket Size Histogram Model Fit (Order Padding Model with Upper Tail Demand)
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3.5. Analysis
We now analytically examine our models to investigate the conditions under which a free
shipping threshold policy can be used to help maximize profits for online retailers in general.
3.5.1. The Effect of Free Shipping Threshold on Profit Components
We begin by examining properties of the expected basket size function D(τ ). Given Equation 3.4, it can easily be observed that D(0) = E[X], limτ →∞ D(τ ) → E[X], and that
D(τ ) > E[X] for all τ > 0. When there is no free shipping (τ → ∞) or free shipping on all
orders (τ = 0), then there is no incentive for customers to adjust basket size. However, any
non-zero finite threshold would act as a carrot just beyond the regular reach of customers,
serving as an incentive to increase their basket size.
These observations also imply the existence of a positive and finite free shipping threshold
τ ∗ that maximizes D(τ ). Thus, a free shipping threshold policy can always be used to
maximize the expected basket size.
Proposition 1 There exists τ ∗ such that D(τ ∗ ) ≥ D(τ ) for any τ > 0. Furthermore, if
the initial demand distribution X is gamma-distributed, then D(τ ) is quasiconcave.
Proof of Proposition 1

The first derivative of the function D(τ ) − E[X] is used to

demonstrate the quasiconcavity of D(τ ). The function D(τ ) − E[X] can be rearranged to:
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if τ −

α
β

<0

(3.14)
if τ −

α
β

≥0

The first order condition of D(τ ) − E[X] is then:
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(3.15)

is positive for small τ and negative for large τ . As τ → ∞,

the derivative approaches zero from below. These properties of

∂
∂τ (D(τ ) − E[X])

imply that

D(τ ) is quasiconcave when the initial distribution X follows the gamma distribution.



The quasiconcavity result also holds an important implication for the choice of free shipping
threshold. Quasiconcavity implies that for any free shipping threshold below the optimal
τ ∗ , there exists another free shipping threshold greater than τ ∗ that would achieve at least
the same level of expected order size. Thus, it is possible that a large change in the free
shipping threshold will not affect the average basket size, as is the case with the partner
retailer.
The above result also implies that the average basket size will decrease for sufficiently high
τ . Thus, the free shipping threshold needs to be high enough to entice customers into order
padding, but not so high that it becomes burdensome to add more items to the basket.
This result differs from that of Lewis et al. (2006), whose estimates suggest that a higher
free shipping threshold would always lead to a greater average basket size.
It can also be shown that the expected shipping fee function R(τ ) is always increasing with
respect to the free shipping threshold τ for any underlying demand distribution X. As
τ increases, less proportion of orders will qualify for free shipping and the online retailer
can successfully levy more shipping revenue even when there is order padding. Given the
form of the expected profit per order Π(τ ) = M D(τ ) + R(τ ) − K − Q(τ ), Corollary 1 that
describes the relationship between the basket size maximizing τ and the expected profit per
order maximizing τ in the absence of product returns.
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Proposition 2 The first derivative of the average shipping charge with respect to the free
shipping threshold is always positive and is expressed as follows:







 φK βF (τ ) + (1 − α)f (τ )

d
R(τ ) =
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 φK β F (τ ) − F (τ − ) + (1 − α)f (τ )
β
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β
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(3.16)

Corollary 1 Assume that there is no product return. The optimal τ ∗ that maximizes the
expected profit per order is always greater than arg max D(τ ).
Due to free shipping effects γ2large , γ2pad , ρlarge
, and ρpad
2
2 , the expected product return cost
function may not be quasiconcave. However, since the return probability and return amount
are mainly driven by an order’s basket size, the behavior of the expected product return
cost function is similar to that of the expected basket size function for most reasonable
parameters.
3.5.2. The Effectiveness of Free Shipping Threshold as a Profit Maximization Mechanism
We now analyze the effect of a free shipping threshold on the expected profit per order and
the expected profit per dollar sales. To simplify this analysis, we first assume that there is
no product return. We then discuss how various product return parameters would affect
the main result.
Assuming no product return, it is strictly better to charge an arbitrarily high free shipping
threshold (τ → ∞) than to provide free shipping to all customers (τ = 0). This is because
both profitability metrics can be boosted by levying shipping fees from all orders. If the
increase in the shipping revenue exceeds the increase in the expected gross margin through
order padding, then it would be impossible for the online retailer to benefit through free
shipping threshold policies. This leads to the following condition for maximizing expected
profit per order:
Proposition 3 Assume that there is no product return. If there exists some τ ∈ (0, ∞) that
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satisfy the following conditions, then a free shipping threshold policy can maximize expected
profit per order for the online retailer:

D(τ ) − E[X]
φK
,
<
M
F (τ ) 1 − α + β(τ − E[X|X < τ ])

φK
<
M
F (τ −

α
)
β

+ (F (τ ) − F (τ −

D(τ ) − E[X]
1 − α + β(τ − E[X|τ −

α
))
β

α
β

if τ <

α
β

(3.17)

,
< X < τ ])

if τ ≥

α
β

(3.18)

where D(τ ) is defined as in Equation 3.4.
Given a particular form of initial demand parameter X, the inequalities are more likely to
be satisfied when the gross margin rate M is high and when the shipping fee φK is low.
This means that an online retailer selling high margin items that charges relatively low
shipping fees is the most likely to benefit from a free shipping threshold policy.
Theorem 1 A free shipping threshold policy is more likely to maximize expected profit per
order when the retailer faces a (i) high gross margin rate and (ii) low shipping fees.
It can also be shown that if the online retailer can maximize the expected profit per dollar
sales, then it can also maximize the expected profit per order. This implies that a free
shipping threshold policy is more effective when customers do not adjust their purchase
timing after order padding.
Theorem 2 Assume that there is no product return. If there exists τ1∗ ∈ (0, ∞) such that
Π(τ1∗ )
D(τ1∗ )

>

Π(τ )
D(τ )

for all τ > 0, then there exists τ2∗ ∈ (0, ∞) such that Π(τ2∗ ) > Π(τ ) for all

τ > 0.
Proof of Theorem 2

Suppose that there does not exist a τ2∗ ∈ (0, ∞) such that Π(τ2∗ ) >

Π(τ ) for all τ > 0 when there exists τ1∗ ∈ (0, ∞) such that

Π(τ1∗ )
D(τ1∗ )

>

Π(τ )
D(τ )

for all τ > 0.

Assuming no product return, this would mean limτ →∞ Π(τ ) > Π(0) with Π(τ ) attaining its
maximum as τ → ∞. This further implies

Π(τ )
D(τ )

contradiction.

<

Π(∞)
D(τ )

≤

Π(∞)
D(∞)

for all τ > 0, which is a
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Corollary 2 The free shipping threshold policy is more effective for lower values of η.
Theorem 2 shows that if there exists an interior global maximum for the expected profit per
dollar sales metric, then there must also exist an interior global maximum for the expected
profit per order metric. This observation leads to the corollary that a free shipping threshold
is more effective for lower values of η, when the expected profit per order metric has greater
weight on the online retailer’s objective function. Intuitively, it would be more difficult
for the online retailer to generate more profit over a fixed period of time if more customers
delay their future purchase as a result of order padding. Thus, an important determinant in
the effectiveness of a free shipping threshold lies in the propensity of customers to smooth
their purchases over time. For online retailers selling commodity goods that are easy to
stockpile (e.g. nonperishable food, household items etc.), a free shipping threshold policy
is unlikely to improve its profitability.
The inequalities in Proposition 3 suggest that product returns will always reduce the effectiveness of the free shipping threshold policy. Product returns always have a negative
impact on profits, since they represent lost margin and extra logistics cost. Parameters γ0
and ρ1 , which represent the base return probability and the base return proportion respectively, reduces the actual gross margin rate from M to M (1 − γ0 ρ1 ). Parameters γ1 , γ2large ,
, and ρpad
γ2pad , ρlarge
2 , if positive, are equivalent to adding negative values to E[Y ], which
2
reduces D(τ ) − E[X]. Thus, free shipping threshold policies are more effective for retailers
that face low return probability and low return proportion.
Product return cost can also lead to profit functions with local maximum or global interior
minimum. This is because product return parameters γ1 , γ2large , γ2pad , ρlarge
, and ρpad
2
2
penalize the objective function more heavily in the interior region of τ (where order padding
is more common) than near extreme values of τ . Consider a case where customers normally
do not return items (γ0 = 0, γ1 = 0) but return all of the order if there is order padding
(γ2pad = 1, ρpad
= 1). Such a condition would lead to the existence of a global interior
2
minimum for the online retailer’s objective function, since any additional sales generated
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through order padding will ultimately reduce both the expected profit per order and the
expected profit per dollar sales.

3.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a data-driven model and methodology for online retailers to
evaluate the profit impact of free shipping threshold decisions. We develop models of online
retail demand and product return that are grounded in empirical observations. The models
specifically account for the customers’ tendency to make extra purchases at checkout to
qualify for free shipping (order padding), as well as the effect of strategic returns that can
result from order padding. These models help establish key trade-offs between basket size,
shipping fees, and product return costs.
We apply these models to actual transaction and product return data and demonstrate the
outsize impact of a free shipping threshold on online retailers’ profits. In particular, we
evaluate the decision by the partner retailer to lower its free shipping threshold to one-third
of the original level. The model-based analyses show that this decision would have resulted
in nearly 18-20% loss in profits and is consistent with the actual observed consequence.
The analysis also shows that there is no statistical evidences of a short-term sales boost or
long-term growth that can be attributed to a lower free shipping threshold.
A more general analysis of the model reveals online retailers can benefit from free shipping
thresholds only in some situations. High margin retailers that charge low shipping fees have
the greatest chance of benefiting from a free shipping threshold policy. The effectiveness of
a free shipping threshold policy is further increased when the retailer faces low probability
or low proportion of product return and when order padding does not cause customers to
delay their future purchase.
The demand model and product return model proposed in this chapter allows retailers to
evaluate the impacts of different free shipping threshold levels without having to run A/B
tests. According to conversations with retail practitioners, experiments are the primary
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method to evaluate the potential impact of policy changes in an online store. However,
experiments can be infeasible in some instances and offer limited information outside of the
scope of the test. This model-based approach provides a more general methodology that
allows retailers to leverage their existing data.
Free shipping thresholds are an important and perhaps the most visible customer-facing
decision in online retail. We offer a model and implementation guidelines to help online
retailers determine their optimal free shipping threshold level. The modeling approach described in this chapter can extend to more general threshold-based policies where behavioral
mechanisms can be an important factor.
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CHAPTER 4 : The Revenue Impact of Dynamic Pricing Policies in Major League
Baseball Ticket Sales
4.1. Introduction
Dynamic pricing is a revenue management tool that is now commonly used in a variety
of industries. Despite its widespread adoption, firms often encounter significant practical
challenges in implementing and evaluating effective dynamic pricing strategies. When firms
introduce dynamic pricing, they typically have very little price sensitivity data – a fundamental component of a dynamic pricing strategy. Price sensitivity can be particularly
hard to estimate when a firm sells multiple products simultaneously, since this estimation
must also account for potential demand substitutions. The problem is further complicated
when the firm needs to account for external market shocks that affect demand in its pricing
model. Finally, various internal pricing policies affect the price path throughout the selling
season, but their revenue implications remain unclear. As a result, many firms are left in
the dark not only in designing and improving their dynamic pricing policies, but also in
evaluating the effectiveness of their present dynamic pricing policies.
This chapter studies the initial implementation of dynamic pricing for single game tickets
in Major League Baseball (MLB). This study was conducted in partnership with a particular MLB franchise that used the first half of the MLB playing season to conduct price
experiments and used the second half of the season to implement dynamic pricing. The
partner franchise, in choosing to adopt dynamic pricing strategies, faced the same aforementioned challenges. The franchise had no prior data on customer price sensitivity, having
used a fixed pricing policy during previous seasons. It also faced a unique challenge in
multiproduct dynamic pricing, since up to 81 home games can be on sale at the same time,
each with 14 seat sections. Demand forecasting in this setting is also a challenging task,
since external factors such as team performance can significantly affect customer valuation.
Finally, the franchise maintained various internal pricing policies to ensure a reasonable de-
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gree of stability in its day-to-day pricing and the revenue impact of these policies remained
unquantified.
We investigate the impact of dynamic pricing in this quasi-experimental setting by developing and estimating a comprehensive customer demand model. The detailed modeling of
customer behavior is particularly useful in sports entertainment settings with many complexities that limit the effectiveness of methods such as demand forecasting using early
season sales and demand learning. Early season sales inform very little about late season
sales in sports tickets settings since customer valuation can vary significantly over the course
of the season based on factors such as the home team performance (Whitney 1988). Given
the underlying variation in customer ticket valuation, the effectiveness of demand learning is
also limited. Demand for baseball tickets is often concentrated near the game day and price
updates are relatively infrequent. However, business managers do not find price adjustment
on more than a daily frequency to be an attractive option, but most home games see about
30% of sales taking place on the actual game day. In these contexts, modeling customer
responses in a dynamic pricing setting can help inform researchers and practitioners about
key demand drivers and provide guidance on designing appropriate pricing policies.
Using ticket sales data from the MLB franchise, we build a customer demand model for
sports events that envelope three facets of demand generation: the event demand (demand
for a particular home game), customers’ ticket quantity choice, and customers’ seat section
choice. First, customer arrivals (demand) for a particular home game are realized according
to a stochastic process. Then, upon arrival, customers choose the ticket quantity and the
seat section desired. The event demand and ticket quantity choice is modeled using negative
binomial regression. The seat section choice is modeled using multinomial logit choice
model. A key feature of the model is the separation of the demand generation process
and the choice process, which allows an efficient computation of a large-scale multiproduct
pricing problem.
The empirical setting discussed in this chapter includes two pricing regimes, which endows
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a natural training set and a testing set for the model. We use data from the first half of
the season (the fixed pricing regime) to estimate and validate the model. We then use data
from the second half of the season (the dynamic pricing regime) to forecast demand and
explore optimal dynamic pricing policies.
The model estimation yields two critical insights that are useful for the design of dynamic
pricing policies. First, the results show that exogenous events significantly influence customer valuation of baseball tickets. It is estimated that each extra win by the home team has
the same effect on demand as lowering ticket prices by $1.07. More importantly, the results
show that customers exhibit a significant network effect (or scarcity effect). Specifically,
it is estimated that each 1% increase in overall attendance at the time of customer arrival
has the same effect on demand as lowering ticket prices by $3.47 even after controlling for
various factors such as remaining selling horizon.
Based on these insights, we examine the effectiveness of pricing policies that consider not
only remaining selling horizon and inventory, but also account for the effect of team performance and observed attendance at the time of purchase. Through counterfactual simulations, we find that the actual dynamic pricing policy adopted by our partner franchise
underperformed its original fixed pricing policy by 2.1%. We show that an optimized dynamic pricing policy with sufficient price flexibility can improve revenue by 15%. At the
same time, we also show that more than 95% of this revenue improvement can be obtained
through a carefully calibrated fixed pricing policy.
In this chapter, we provide a framework for evaluating and designing multiproduct dynamic
pricing policies through detailed modeling of customer demand. This approach is particularly effective when “demand shifts” (i.e. changes in customer valuation) is observable
in real-time. This approach also helps managers identify high impact demand drivers and
allows them to design more intuitive pricing policies. We also provide empirical evidence of
a network/scarcity effect in the sports entertainment industry. The implication of such network effect on dynamic pricing is itself a promising avenue for future investigation. Finally,
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this chapter adds to the body of empirical studies in revenue management, which informs
academics of the practical challenges of implementing effective revenue management policies
in various multiproduct monopoly settings.
4.1.1. Related Literature
There is an emerging interest in empirical studies on the implementation of dynamic pricing
in practice, following theoretical advances in the multiproduct dynamic pricing problem
(Talluri and Van Ryzin 2004, Dong et al. 2009, Akcay et al. 2010, Gallego and Wang
2014). In this chapter, we focus on the application of dynamic pricing in sports tickets,
which is defined by its overall complexity as a multiproduct dynamic pricing problem. The
sports industry also provides a setting other than travel and retail, which are the two most
commonly studied industries in the revenue management literature.
There are a number of empirical studies in dynamic pricing that are similar to the one
described in this chapter. The most notable papers in this field are Caro and Gallien (2012)
and Ferreira et al. (2015). Both papers study pricing optimization in fashion retail, with the
former focusing on markdowns in clearance sales and the latter focusing on static pricing
optimization during online flash sales. In this chapter, we investigate dynamic pricing in the
sports industry where the firm has a much greater degree of pricing flexibility. By focusing
on the sports industry, we are also able to incorporate the effect of key external demand
drivers into dynamic pricing policies, such as the effect of home team performance and
attendance levels at the time of purchase. While demand in fashion retail is also influenced
by external factors, these factors are not as well-defined or measurable compared to those
in the sports industry. Both Caro and Gallien (2012) and Ferreira et al. (2015) quantify the
revenue impact of different pricing policies through randomized field experiments, but we
use counterfactual simulations to evaluate the revenue impact. This is due to the fact that a
randomized experiment is infeasible in sports ticket sales setting. However, the magnitude
of revenue improvement that can be achieved through an optimized dynamic pricing policy
is similar to the aforementioned papers.
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A unique feature of the demand model in this chapter is the ability to address product
substitution, which has not been explicitly considered in prior literature on dynamic pricing
in practice. Caro and Gallien (2012) consider remaining inventory effects but do not model
substitution between different products. Studies on dynamic pricing in the hospitality
industry such as Koushik et al. (2012) consider effects of competitors’ prices but do not
account for the effect of substitution from selling multiple products. We account for product
substitution in a tractable manner by decoupling the purchase decision and product choice
decision in the demand model. This approach allows us to compute the value function of
a large multiproduct dynamic pricing problem without sacrificing a significant amount of
accuracy.
Demand learning is another relevant stream of literature. There have been significant
developments in demand learning through model parameter updates (Besbes and Zeevi
2009, Farias and Van Roy 2010, Besbes and Zeevi 2012, Chen and Farias (2013)) and
nonparametric modeling approaches (Besbes et al. 2010, Farias et al. 2013). However, the
effectiveness of these approaches is limited in the setting described in this chapter, since
price adjustments are infrequent and demand is concentrated toward the end of selling
horizon. We address these issues by developing a model for the entire demand generation
process, and provide a complementing perspective to the demand learning literature. In
this respect, this work is connected to recent literature on demand parameter estimation
through sales data, such as Vulcano et al. (2012), Newman et al. (2014), and Pang et al.
(2015). The findings described in this study also provide empirical justification to works on
real-time demand learning such as Lin (2006), Wang et al. (2014), and den Boer and Zwart
(2015).
Finally, this work is related to several papers that examine pricing in the entertainment industry. Leslie (2004) studies revenue and welfare effects of price discrimination in Broadway
theaters and estimates revenue improvement of 5% through tiered pricing. Veeraraghavan
and Vaidyanathan (2012) examine consumer valuation of seats in stadiums and theaters.
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The model described in this work can also estimate relative value of seats within a stadium,
while simultaneously capturing dynamic elements of customer valuation. There are also a
number of papers that focus on baseball ticket pricing. Sweeting (2012) uses data from
secondary markets for MLB tickets and estimates that dynamic pricing improves expected
revenue for sellers by about 16%. This work studies the same problem from the primary
market perspective and estimates potential improvement of roughly the same magnitude.
Zhu (2014) uses both primary and secondary market data to study optimal dynamic pricing
for MLB tickets under the presence of strategic consumers. However, Zhu (2014) does not
account for dynamic factors that affect demand.

4.2. Empirical Setting and Data Description
This study is conducted in collaboration with a Major League Baseball (MLB) franchise that
implemented a dynamic pricing program midway through a recent Major League Baseball
playing season. During the first half of the season, the franchise used a fixed pricing policy,
in which ticket prices varied across games and seat sections but remained constant across
time. During the second half of the season (a few weeks before the All-Star Break, which is
typically during the middle of the season), the franchise introduced dynamic pricing for 43
of the 47 remaining home games. Ticket prices for these games were allowed to vary across
time and were updated on a daily basis.
The franchise wished to maximize revenue from ticket sales for these home games, each
game with 14 seat sections across the stadium. All single-game tickets would go on sale
simultaneously in late February. While seats sold to season ticket holders would be unavailable for general sale, there were sufficient capacity in all seat sections to accommodate
demand from general sales. Dynamic pricing was introduced to help maximize revenue
from this process, and also as a part of the general trend across the North American sports
industry.
The dynamic pricing decisions during the season were based on discussions among a pricing
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committee. A software tool developed by a third-party vendor provided price recommendations by looking at remaining selling horizon, remaining inventory, and team performance
forecasts. The pricing committee would then review these recommendations and update
ticket prices on a daily basis. The franchise also imposed an internal pricing policy that
would not allow ticket prices to decrease throughout the selling horizon. As a result, this
process led to an increasing price path as the game day approached. There was also a
special restriction on the price relationship among seat sections to maintain the connection between the price and the quality of the seats (details of this constraint is described
in Section 4.3.3). Figure 17 is an example of the actual price path for a particular home
game after the dynamic pricing policy was put in practice. Prices of six representative seat
sections are shown in this figure.
Figure 17: Actual Price Path of Select Seat Sections for a Sample Home Game

The franchise also performed price adjustments for a few games in the first half of the
season. These games were chosen due to their high level of perceived popularity (weekend
games against nationally popular opponents), and they had the highest seat prices at the
beginning of the selling season. While the games with price adjustments during the first
half of the season were chosen at random, the high level of perceived popularity for these
games alleviates endogeneity concerns. Price sensitivity parameters can be estimated based
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on price variations across time from these high profile games along with price variations
across games from the fixed pricing policy.
The franchise provided data on single game ticket sales and daily ticket prices for the entire
season. The sales data are at the transaction level and each record consists of time of
purchase, number of tickets purchased, price paid, and the choice of seat section. The sales
data include all tickets sold at the box office and the online channel, but do not include
season ticket sales. No personally identifiable customer ID or individual level demographic
information was included in the sales data. This study focus on transactions that took
place after the MLB Opening Day, which coincided with the opening game at home. The
exclusion of the home opener was decided prior to the analysis based on conversations with
the front office of the franchise. The reasoning behind this decision was that demand for
the home opener is known to differ substantially from regular season demand.
The pricing data are at the daily level and contain posted prices for each game and seat
section combination. In addition to the price data, the franchise provided data on the
number of cumulative number of tickets sold to date for each game and seat section combination. The cumulative ticket sales data include sales from various channels such as season
tickets, group tickets and complimentary tickets as well. In this study, cumulative attendance is expressed in terms of the percentage of seats sold for each game and seat section
combination.
The franchise also provided game-specific data such as the start time, game day weather,
and promotion schedule. Finally, we scraped data on the number of wins and losses at
any given day in the season for all 30 MLB teams from baseball-reference.com, as well
as playoff odds for the franchise from baseball-prospectus.com. This data is used to
measure team performance in terms of wins above .500 (the number of wins minus the
number of losses) and in terms of the likelihood of qualifying for playoffs.
The presence of the two distinct pricing regimes allows the data to naturally separate into
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a training set and a testing set. The first half of the season (the fixed price regime) will be
used to estimate and validate our demand model. The second half of the season (the dynamic price regime) will be used to generate revenue forecast and to conduct counterfactual
simulations for various pricing policies.

4.3. Customer Demand Model
The ability to predict demand given a price path is integral to developing an effective
dynamic pricing strategy. To this end, we develop a comprehensive model that encompasses
three stages of customer demand generation: game demand, ticket quantity choice and
seat section choice. In the first stage, demand for a particular game is realized through
a stochastic arrival process. In the second stage, customers from the realized demand
decide on the number of tickets to purchase for that particular game. In the third stage,
customers from the realized demand choose a seat section given the number of tickets
required. Outputs of these three models are combined to generate a forecast of the expected
revenue given a pricing policy.
The model variables are listed in Table 27. The model variables can be classified into five
broad categories: time effects, game characteristics, price effect, attendance effect and team
performance effects. We consider average price and average attendance across the entire
stadium in the game demand model and ticket quantity choice model, while seat section
level prices are used in the seat section choice model. The information represented by these
model variables is easily accessible to customers at the time of purchase.
In this section, we present the final implementation of the model among many specifications
that were examined. The model selection was based on a combination of factors such as
aggregate forecast accuracy with the test data, log-likelihood and AIC with the training
data, and discussions with managers from our partner MLB franchise. Model estimation
and validation are discussed in Section 4.4.
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Table 27: List of Model Parameters
Category
Time Effects

Game Characteristics

Team Performance
Price Effect
Attendance Effect

Variable Name
LOGDAYSTILGAME
LOGDAYSTILGAMESQ
GAMEDAY1,· · · ,GAMEDAY8
GAMEDAYRAIN
GAMEDAYSTARTHR
OPP1,· · · ,OPP15
GIVEAWAY
FOODPROMO
SATGAME
SUNGAME
DAYGAME
LOWERTIER
MIDTIER
HOMETEAMRECORD
OPPONENTRECORD
PRICE
ATTENDANCE
ATTENDANCESQ

Description
log(number of days until game + 1)
Square of the log number of days term
Last 8 days before game dummies
“Is game day and is raining” dummy
“Is game day” dummy interacted with start time
Identity of the opposing team dummies
Giveaway promotion dummy
Food-related promotion dummy
Saturday game dummy
Sunday game dummy
Day game dummy
“Lower tier” fixed price dummy
“Mid tier” fixed price dummy
Wins above .500 for the home team
Wins above .500 for the opponent
Average ticket price in the stadium
Average attendance to date (in %)
Square of the attendance term

4.3.1. Game Demand Model
Each home game is considered a product to be sold i = 1, . . . , M , where M = 81. The
selling horizon is discretized into periods (days). Since tickets for all home games in the
season go on public sale on the same day, each product (game i) has a different selling
horizon denoted by Ti periods. The selling horizon for game i begins at t = 1, marking
the first day of the selling season, which coincides with the day after the MLB Opening
Day. t = Ti marks the game-day for product i. For each period t ∈ [1, Ti ] that product i
is on sale, customer demand is realized based on a stochastic process nit , which represents
the aggregate number of daily orders (i.e. number of unique transactions). Each customer
transaction among nit transactions can involve a purchase of multiple tickets in a particular
seat section. We model the composition of the random variable nit (the ticket quantity
choice) in Section 4.3.2. We model the seat section choice for each order in Section 4.3.3.
Since the number of daily orders is a nonnegative integer, a negative binomial regression
is used to model demand for game i at time t. The dependent variable nit is assumed to
follow a negative binomial distribution with parameters µit and κ.

nit ∼ Negbin(µit , κ)
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Here, µit represents the expectation of the negative binomial distribution. The variance of
the negative binomial distribution is given by µ + κµ2 . A log link function is applied so
that log (µit ) = x0it β, where xit is the vector of model covariates for product i at time t. β
is a vector of model coefficients. Table 27 lists the vector of model covariates for the game
demand model.
Effects of time are controlled using covariates such as the log of number of days until
game i at time t, and dummy variables for each of the last 8 days before the game day.
Game characteristic variables control for various factors that can affect attendance such as
opponent, price category, type of game (e.g. day game, weekend game etc.), and promotion.
Team performance is measured in terms of wins above .500, which is the difference between
the number of wins and the number of losses by a team at time t. The team performance
metric is tracked for both the home team and opponents throughout the season. The average
price for the entire stadium (unweighted mean of the 14 seat sections) is used to control for
the price effect. Finally, the model controls for effects of cumulative attendance at the time
of a customer’s purchase. The cumulative attendance is calculated by the number of seats
sold across the stadium up to time t divided by the total capacity, expressed in percentage.
Negative binomial regression allows us to capture overdispersion, which is an important
empirical feature in the data. For robustness check, we also considered an OLS model
(which can result in negative values of demand estimate) and a Poisson regression model.
The negative binomial model is superior to these models both in terms of appropriateness
and model fit. These findings are summarized in Table 28. The NBD model has the lowest
AIC among the three candidate models when applied to the training data. Another metric
to evaluate the model fit is the forecast of the total number of orders in the test data given
actual prices. The actual number of orders observed is 51,942 and the model forecasts from
each model are shown in column 3 of Table 28. The results show that the NBD model
performs the best and is also within 5% error of the actual number of orders observed.
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Table 28: Comparison of NBD, Poisson and OLS Model
Model
NBD
Poisson
OLS

AIC
23,447
45,077
37,648

Forecast # of Orders
49,451
46,760
75,310

Forecast Error
4.8%
10.0%
45.0%

4.3.2. Ticket Quantity Model
The second stage of the customer demand model is the ticket quantity choice. Each demand
that is realized in the first stage can order multiple tickets. This stage of customer demand
is modeled using another negative binomial regression, independent from the game demand
model. This specification is again useful because the number of tickets is also a count data
with overdispersion. This observation is in line with observations of ticket demand for other
social experience goods. The same set of variables is used as the game demand model.
The ticket quantity model captures the number of tickets purchased qjt for each order j
placed at time t. Since the model population is now the set of realized demand (unique
orders on day t), each order must contain at least one order. The model adjusts for the
zero-truncation by having the variable qjt represent the observed number of tickets minus
one.
This stage of the model is important because it directly affects the seat section choice.
Most customers attend baseball games in groups and the size of the group will affect their
seat section preference. A large group is much more likely to choose more inexpensive seat
sections such as outfield or upper deck locations compared to a smaller group. Thus, each
transaction j at time t is allowed to have a realized ticket demand quantity qjt + 1, which
will then be used as a component of the seat section choice model.
4.3.3. Seat Choice Model
The last stage of the customer demand process is the seat section choice. Given the game
choice and ticket quantity, customers now select a location in the stadium. This process is
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modeled using the standard MNL model. Outside option is not included in this case, since
customers are committed to purchasing tickets at this stage of the model. Customers are
allowed to choose from the 14 seat sections in the stadium (see Table 29). The bleacher
section is used as the reference level to normalize the model since the price of this section
was fixed at $10 for every game (in addition to being the most inexpensive seat section).
Pricing across seat sections must satisfy certain constraints, described in the third column
of Table 29, to maintain the relationship between price and quality. These constraints will
be later incorporated into the price optimization procedure in Section 4.5.
Table 29: List of Seat Sections in the Stadium
Seat Sections
Premium 1
Premium 2
Premium 3
Home Plate 1
Home Plate 2
Home Plate 3
Dugout
1st/3rd Base Line
Outfield 1
Outfield 2
Upper Deck 1
Upper Deck 2
Upper Deck 3
Bleacher

Maximum Price
$135
$135
$135
$120
$120
$115
$115
$80
$75
$35
$40
$35
$30
$10

Price Less Than
n/a
Premium 1
Premium 2
n/a
Home Plate 1
Dugout
Home Plate 2
Dugout
1st/3rd Base Line
Outfield 1
n/a
Upper Deck 1
Upper Deck 2
n/a

The seat section choice model will contain price effect, time effect and the number of tickets
effect. For a seat section k in stadium seat section set S, the probability of a customer
choosing this seat section at time t given seat section price pkt is:

P

exp (αijkt + θp pkt )
.
l∈S exp (αijlt + θp plt )

(4.1)

In the above equation αijkt is the seat section level intercept of how likely it is to be chosen,
which is a function of the number of days until game and the number of tickets required.
The intercept for seat section k for an order coming in at time t for game i (with Ti selling
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periods) that needs j tickets is defined as:

αijkt = γk + τk log (Ti − t + 1) + ηk j.

(4.2)

This specification is captures relevant empirical tendencies in the data. In general, the
best seat sections tend to be sold earlier than other seat sections. In addition, customers
requiring more tickets are less likely to purchase expensive seat sections. These effects are
incorporated into the multinomial logit model by allowing the intercept of each seat section
to vary across time and the size of ticket demand.
4.3.4. Model Discussion
The modeling framework in this study follows an earlier work by Moe et al. (2011) where the
authors develop a demand model for sport event through the EBA (Elimination by Aspects)
model. We propose a more general regression based modeling approach that splits demand
generation into three processes: orders placed for each event, ticket quantity choice, and
seat section choice. This approach is similar to that of Maglaras and Meissner (2006). An
alternative approach to modeling customer demand with substitution that can be applicable
in our setting would be the nested logit framework in Anderson and Xie (2012) or Gallego
and Wang (2014). However, the computational burden can be alleviated substantially by
separating the demand generation process and the product choice process.
Demand for each game is modeled as an independent stochastic process. The model does not
account for the effect of competition with secondary market (Cooper et al. 2015 examines
this issue in detail), substitution across games (allow substitution across seat sections is
allowed), or strategic customer behavior. While these modeling choices are based on data
limitations to some degree (no customer traffic or secondary market data), the general
assumption is appropriate for this particular setting since the model is able to capture the
effect of competition and substitution implicitly in the estimate of the price effect. This
approach works well in this particular setting, as demonstrated by the model fit presented
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in Section 4.4.2.

4.4. Model Estimation and Validation
In this section, we discuss the model estimates using the training data and the model fit
using the test data. We split the sales and pricing data into two parts based on the pricing
policy adopted by the partner MLB franchise. The first half of the season with fixed prices
(where prices remained constant over time) will be used to estimate the model parameter
through maximum likelihood estimation. Since the demand arrival model and the choice
model are considered separately, there is no need to adjust for unobserved demand through
the EM method. The second half of the season with dynamic pricing (where prices changed
over time), will be used to test the model fit. The total revenue (both aggregate and on an
individual game basis) is used as the model fit criterion.
4.4.1. Parameter Estimates
We use the first half of the season with fixed pricing to estimate model parameters. Table
30 shows the game demand model and the ticket quantity model parameter estimates.
The estimates are consistent with intuition: lower prices and promotions lead to higher
demand. Demand is increasing as the game day approaches, with large increases in the
last 8 days before the game. The results also show that team performance and observed
attendance at the time of purchase can have significant influence on demand. The former
effect is referred to as “win effect” and the latter effect is referred to as “crowd effect”.
The model estimates suggest that all else being equal, an extra win for the home team
leads to demand increase that is equivalent to lowering ticket prices by $1.09 across the
entire stadium. Similarly, a 1% higher overall attendance level (at the time of purchase)
has the same demand impact as lowering ticket prices by $3.47 across the entire stadium.
The win effect and the crowd effect are also observed in the ticket quantity choice model.
Better home team performance and higher overall attendance increase the average quantity
of tickets purchased in a given order. The relative magnitudes of these effects in the ticket
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quantity choice model are equivalent to lowering ticket prices by $0.79 (for each additional
win) and $5.97 (for a 1% higher overall attendance) across the stadium respectively.
Table 30: Game Demand Model and Ticket Quantity Model Parameter Estimates
Category
Intercept

Variable

Price and Attendance

PRICE
ATTENDANCE
ATTENDANCESQ

Team Performance

HOMETEAMRECORD
OPPONENTRECORD

Time Effect

LOGDAYSTILGAME
LOGDAYSTILGAMESQ
GAMEDAY1
GAMEDAY2
GAMEDAY3
GAMEDAY4
GAMEDAY5
GAMEDAY6
GAMEDAY7
GAMEDAY8
GAMEDAYRAIN
GAMEDAYSTARTHR

Game Characteristics

GIVEAWAY
FOODPROMO
SATGAME
SUNGAME
DAYGAME
LOWERTIER
MIDTIER
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Game Demand
1.7424∗
(0.8728)
−0.0350∗∗
(0.0126)
0.1215∗∗∗
(0.0243)
−0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0003)
0.0380∗∗∗
(0.0083)
−0.0163∗
(0.0064)
0.7317∗
(0.3195)
−0.2103∗∗∗
(0.0428)
2.9465∗
(1.3389)
2.0508∗∗∗
(0.4339)
1.4637∗∗∗
(0.3542)
1.0746∗∗∗
(0.3139)
0.7646∗∗
(0.2836)
0.7209∗∗
(0.2649)
0.6055∗
(0.2493)
0.5639∗
(0.2375)
−0.0922
(0.5831)
−0.0062
(0.0713)
0.4338∗∗∗
(0.0711)
0.2031∗∗
(0.0699)
−0.0162
(0.0708)
−0.1997∗
(0.0848)
0.1054
(0.0633)
−1.1318∗∗∗
(0.2678)
−0.0035

Ticket Quantity
0.8261∗∗∗
(0.1863)
−0.0043∗∗∗
()
0.0543∗∗∗
(0.0054)
−0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0001)
0.0072∗
(0.0028)
−0.0157∗∗∗
(0.00213)
−0.1653
(0.0890)
0.0292∗
(0.0128)
−0.7793∗∗∗
(0.1728)
−0.4400∗∗∗
(0.0957)
−0.3133∗∗∗
(0.0714)
−0.1780∗∗
(0.0582)
−0.1687∗∗∗
(0.0503)
−0.1713∗∗∗
(0.0453)
−0.0728
(0.0410)
−0.0427
(0.0381)
0.0612
(0.0614)
0.0489∗∗∗
(0.0054)
−0.1142∗∗∗
(0.0161)
0.0489∗
(0.0197)
0.1503∗∗∗
(0.0187)
−0.0964∗∗∗
(0.0226)
0.1229∗∗∗
(0.0172)
−0.3940∗∗∗
(0.0575)
−0.1510∗∗∗

(0.1003)
0.1705
(0.1377)
0.0410
(0.1406)
−0.3496∗
(0.1432)
0.1143
(0.1091)
−0.4010∗
(0.1649)
−0.7535∗∗∗
(0.1431)
−0.0431
(0.1326)
−0.2138
(0.1492)
0.9895∗∗∗
(0.1755)
−0.6745∗∗∗
(0.1414)
0.1550
(0.1386)
−0.2568
(0.2101)
−0.1101
(0.1131)
0.0201
(0.1229)
−2.6454∗∗∗
(0.6017)
0.7778∗∗∗
(0.0227)
4247
23447

OPP1
OPP2
OPP3
OPP4
OPP5
OPP6
OPP7
OPP8
OPP9
OPP10
OPP11
OPP12
OPP13
OPP14
OPP15
1/Dispersion

1/κ

N
AIC
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

(0.0272)
−0.2534∗∗∗
(0.0471)
−0.2457∗∗∗
(0.0435)
0.1290∗
(0.0598)
−0.1872∗∗∗
(0.0406)
0.2244∗∗∗
(0.0437)
−0.0821
(0.0528)
−0.2255∗∗∗
(0.0449)
−0.2586∗∗∗
(0.0558)
−0.0941∗
(0.0478)
−0.0440
(0.0699)
−0.1124∗∗
(0.0414)
0.0557
(0.0701)
0.0306
(0.0406)
0.0664
(0.0399)
−0.0729
(0.2156)
1.3148∗∗∗
(0.0114)
46830
198324

p < 0.001

Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 31 shows key parameter estimates for several representative seat sections in the seat
section choice model. Consistent with empirical observation, expensive seat sections are
sold out earlier as indicated by positive τk estimates. Larger groups are also less likely to
choose expensive seat sections, as indicated by negative ηk .
Table 31: Seat Section Choice Model Parameter Estimates
Variable
PRICE

Seat Section

Intercepts

Premium 1
Premium 2
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Estimate
−0.0292∗∗∗
(0.0012)
0.2760∗
(0.1298)
−0.4308∗∗

Premium 3
Home Plate 1
Home Plate 2
Home Plate 3
Dugout
1st/3rd Base Line
Outfield 1
Outfield 2
Upper Deck 1
Upper Deck 2
Upper Deck 3
log(Days Until Game+1)
τk

Premium 1
Premium 2
Premium 3
Home Plate 1
Home Plate 2
Home Plate 3
Dugout
1st/3rd Base Line
Outfield 1
Outfield 2
Upper Deck 1
Upper Deck 2
Upper Deck 3

# of Tickets
ηk

Premium 1
Premium 2
Premium 3
Home Plate 1
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(0.1538)
−0.0393
(0.1212)
−2.6564∗
(1.1058)
−0.0803
(0.2060)
−1.1331∗∗∗
(0.2393)
1.1471∗∗∗
(0.0750)
0.6418∗∗∗
(0.0636)
0.8621∗∗∗
(0.0537)
−0.1827∗∗
(0.0602)
−0.8318∗∗∗
(0.0850)
−0.2303∗∗∗
(0.0558)
−0.7101∗∗∗
(0.0758)
0.2112∗∗∗
(0.0260)
0.0893∗
(0.0363)
0.1138∗∗∗
(0.0273)
−0.0580
(0.2895)
−0.1603∗∗
(0.0614)
−0.1121
(0.0669)
0.4637∗∗∗
(0.0161)
0.3001∗∗∗
(0.0148)
0.0706∗∗∗
(0.0136)
0.0040
(0.0162)
0.2144∗∗∗
(0.0214)
0.1286∗∗∗
(0.0149)
0.0564∗∗
(0.0202)
−0.1040∗∗∗
(0.0229)
−0.1325∗∗∗
(0.0336)
−0.1078∗∗∗
(0.0243)
−0.7830

Home Plate 2
Home Plate 3
Dugout
1st/3rd Base Line
Outfield 1
Outfield 2
Upper Deck 1
Upper Deck 2
Upper Deck 3
# of Transactions
Log-likelihood
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

(0.4735)
−0.3772∗∗∗
(0.0661)
−0.4357∗∗∗
(0.0812)
−0.2109∗∗∗
(0.0132)
−0.0967∗∗∗
(0.0120)
−0.0262∗
(0.0108)
0.0327
(0.0125)
−0.0552∗∗
(0.0177)
−0.0186
(0.0116)
−0.1342∗∗∗
(0.0182)

46830
-68359
p < 0.001

Standard errors in parentheses.

An interesting observation from these demand estimates is the effect of overall attendance
on demand (which the customer can observe at the time of purchase). The presence of crowd
effect suggests a strong network effect (or a scarcity effect) in sports ticket consumption.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that having more attendance is generally beneficial for a sports
event as it improves the stadium atmosphere. The model estimates quantify the amount of
this benefit and also show that this effect is concave. The crowd effect is maximized between
46-47% overall attendance and becomes negative between 93-94% overall attendance. In a
related research, Rao and Schaefer (2013) study dynamic pricing where consumer utility
is sensitive to consumption decisions of others in the market. In this particular setting,
consumer utility is positively affected by others’ decision to consume the same product.
Alternative specifications of the demand model were also tested, leading to similar insights.
In one variant of the model, home team playoff odds (the probability of the home team
qualifying for MLB Postseason) was used to measure home team performance instead of
the wins over .500 metric. The results showed that each additional 1% playoff odd would
have equivalent effect on demand as $0.35 discount on tickets. In another variant, opponent
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characteristics were used instead of dummy variables. Each opponent was characterized by
the total payroll in this particular season (in millions of dollars), playoff qualification status
in the previous season, and division opponent indicator variable. The estimates from this
model showed that each additional $1 million in payroll would have equivalent effect on
demand as $0.23 discount on tickets, and last year’s playoff teams would have equivalent
effect on demand as $13.41 discount on tickets. There was no statistically significant effect
for division opponent. However, these alternate models are not used in subsequent analysis
due to inferior model fit.
4.4.2. Model Validation
Given parameter estimates from the training data, we use the test data from the second half
of the season to validate the model. We generate daily sales forecast for every remaining
home game during the test period using the actual price path adopted by the MLB franchise.
We then compare these sales forecasts against the actual sales. The model is evaluated on
two metrics: number of order and total dollar revenue. The “number of orders” metric
represents the unique number of orders that come in each day, which is the most critical
component of our model. Total dollar revenue corresponds to the final model output, which
includes results from the ticket quantity choice and seat section choice model.
In generating the total revenue forecast, each stage of the model was evaluated separately.
For each order, the ticket quantity choice model was used to compute the probability of
observing a particular ticket quantity. Then, for each ticket quantity, the seat section choice
model was used to compute the expected revenue per order associated with a home game i
on sales period t. Finally, the expected revenue per order was multiplied by the “number
of orders” forecast obtained from the game demand model to arrive at the forecast for the
expected total revenue. While this procedure can lead to error propagation across the three
model stages, we show in this section that the aggregate revenue forecast is quite good for
the test data using the actual dynamic prices adopted by the MLB franchise. However, it
is important to note that the forecast is for a different pricing regime and thus may not
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account for certain demand effect of moving to a fully dynamic pricing policy. The team
did not announce the pricing policy change beforehand and there is no archival evidence
that customers were aware of this change.
We first examine model fit for the game-demand model. Figure 18 is the boxplot of forecast
error in terms of the daily number of orders. Figure 19 is the density plot for the same
forecast error. These figures show that forecast errors are roughly normally distributed,
which is indicative of model appropriateness. Figure 20 aggregates errors by the number of
days remaining until game day. There is no systematic error in terms of forecast. Figure 21
is the predicted number of orders plotted against the actual number of orders aggregated
by each home game. The game demand model performs well in terms of the aggregate
number of orders for a particular game. The median absolute deviation (MAD), or the
median absolute percentage error (MAPE), for the number of orders metric is 38.1%.
Figure 18: Boxplot of Forecast Errors from the Game Demand Model

We now examine model fit for the entire customer demand model by combining all three
customer demand models. The metric of interest is now dollar revenue. In the model, past
sales affect future sales (due to the crowd effect) at all three stages of the model. This results
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Figure 19: Density Plot of Forecast Errors from the Game Demand Model Near Zero

Figure 20: Average Forecast Error with Respect to Days Until Game Day

Figure 21: Forecast vs Actual Number of Orders Aggregated by Each Game
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in a dynamic programming formulation of the expected revenue maximization problem, but
the computation is extremely challenging due to the curse of dimensionality. Let R(i, t, ~z)
represent the maximum expected revenue for game i given t remaining selling periods and
remaining seat section inventory vector ~z. The Bellman equation is:



R(i, t, ~z) = max E~s(i,t,~z,~p) p~ · ~s(i, t, ~z, p~) + R i, t − 1, ~z − ~s(i, t, ~z, p~) .
p
~

(4.3)

where p~ is the seat section price vector and ~s(i, t, ~z, p~) is the seat section sales vector at time
t for game i given remaining seat section inventory ~z and seat section pricing p~.
For a long selling horizon and a large number of product offering, an exact calculation of
the expected revenue is infeasible. Instead, we use the following approximation for expected
revenue:


R̃(i, t, ~z) = max p~ · E~s(i,t,~z,~p) [~s(i, t, ~z, p~)] + R̃ i, t − 1, ~z − ~s(i, t, ~z, p~)
p
~

(4.4)

This approximation replaces all future sales with their expected values. The expected daily
sales for each seat section will then be used to adjust the remaining inventory (and in turn
cumulative attendance) on a daily basis. The effect of randomness in daily sales will be
ignored by this approximation. This approximation allows fast computation and sacrifices
minimal accuracy, as verified through Monte Carlo simulation. Figure 22 shows the expected
revenue predictions from the approximation and expected revenue prediction from Monte
Carlo simulation of the full demand model. Similar approximations have also been used
in a number of other papers such as Bertsimas and Popescu (2003) and Caro and Gallien
(2012). Jasin and Kumar (2012) also discusses the theoretical performance of the certainty
equivalent heuristic.
Figure 23 shows the expected revenue forecast by each home game and plots them against
the actual realized revenue. The MAD (or the MAPE) for the revenue forecast at the gameby-game level is 52.9%. The revenue forecast accuracy deteriorates in the later part of the
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Figure 22: Comparison of Game-by-Game Revenue Forecast (Simulation vs Approximation)

testing data due to the home team’s on-field performance. The MAD for the first 20 home
games in the test data is 28.2%, while the MAD for the last 27 home games is 70.5%. The
period of high forecast error coincides with the period of unusual underperformance by the
home team, during which it won less than 35% of its games (Section 4.5 discusses this in
detail).
The aggregate revenue forecast in the second half of the season is $4,296,833 while the
actual total revenue in the second half of the season was $4,517,900. The error is -$221,067,
which is 4.9% of the observed revenue. These findings are summarized in Table 32. One of
the outliers occurred for the last home game, where the actual revenue was more than five
times the revenue forecast. A large portion of the game-by-game errors even out over the
course of the season, leading to a good forecast for the aggregate revenue.
Table 32: Predicted Total Revenue vs Actual Total Revenue

Observed
Predicted

Total Revenue ($K)
4,518
4,297
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Error ($K)
-221

Error (%)
-4.9

Figure 23: Predicted Total Revenue vs Actual Total Revenue

4.5. Evaluating Dynamic Pricing Policies Using the Demand Model
We now use the customer demand model to evaluate counterfactual scenarios with various
dynamic pricing policies. We first analyze the actual dynamic pricing policy adopted by the
partner franchise to examine whether its dynamic pricing resulted in revenue improvement.
We then propose several alternative dynamic pricing policies and evaluate the potential for
further revenue improvement.
We find that the dynamic pricing policy adopted by the franchise resulted in revenue loss
of 2.1%. This loss was primarily caused by the lack of pricing flexibility (particularly in the
inability to lower prices) and a mismatch between the team performance forecast adopted
by the franchise and the actual team performance. The results show that myopic price
optimization with some additional price flexibility can improve revenue by 15%. We also
examine fixed pricing policies and find that an optimized fixed pricing policy can achieve
revenue improvement of 14.4%. Finally, we consider the possibility of a decision-rule based
dynamic pricing policy.
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4.5.1. Effectiveness of the Actual Dynamic Pricing Policy
We first compare two pricing policies: the initial fixed price vs the actual dynamic price.
The former uses the price observed on the last day of the training data for each game
through the remaining selling horizon, while the latter refers to the pricing policy applied
by our partner franchise in reality (see Figure 17 for an example). By comparing these two
policies, we are able to examine the revenue impact from the dynamic prices implemented
by the partner franchise.
Dynamic pricing was used for 43 games out of the remaining 47 home games. We use the
revenue computation approach described in Section 4.4.2 to generate revenue forecasts for
the two pricing policies. Table 33 shows the expected revenue from the initial fixed prices
and the actual dynamic prices. The results show that the revenue from the actual dynamic
prices was lower than the revenue from the initial fixed prices by 2.1%. This means that
the franchise would have realized more revenue by keeping the prices constant rather than
adopting the specific pricing policy that was used in reality. At game-by-game level, there
were 9 games that experienced revenue increase through dynamic pricing, with an average
increase of 0.7%. However, 33 games experienced revenue decrease through dynamic pricing,
with an average decrease of 2.6%. One game was unaffected because prices for that game
remained constant throughout its selling period despite the implementation of the dynamic
pricing policy.
Table 33: Expected Revenue for Initial Fixed Prices vs Actual Dynamic Prices

Initial Fixed Prices
Actual Dynamic Prices

Total Revenue ($K)
4,037
3,953

Change ($K)
-84

Change (%)
-2.1

The results show that 6 out of 9 games with revenue increases took place before mid-July
while only 3 out of 33 games with revenue decrease took place during the same period.
Mid-July was also a turning point for the home team in terms of their on-field performance.
In the latter part of the season, the home team won less than 35% of all its games and
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significantly underperformed relative to expectations. Despite this lack of success on the
field, the franchise had continued to raise its ticket prices, whereas the customer demand
model would have offered the opposite recommendation. The game demand model estimates
show that an extra loss for the home team has the same effect on demand as raising ticket
prices by $1.09 across the entire stadium. Thus, it is very likely that the overall revenue
was negatively affected by the dynamic pricing policy because the legacy software did not
properly account for the effect of external demand factors in the pricing model.
4.5.2. Effectiveness of Optimized Dynamic Pricing Policies
We now propose optimized dynamic pricing policies and evaluate their effectiveness. We
consider two specific policies: myopic dynamic prices, and myopic monotone dynamic prices.
We use the expected revenue from the initial fixed prices described in Section 4.5.1 as the
benchmark to evaluate these policies. The results show that significant revenue improvement
can be achieved despite the simplicity of these policies and that adding a little pricing
flexibility can go a long way towards improving the overall revenue.
Myopic Dynamic Prices Seat section prices are optimized for each home game on a
daily basis to maximize the expected daily revenue. The optimization is performed numerically using the customer demand model. A pre-determined upper bound is imposed
on each seat section price. Ordinal price constraints must also be satisfied so that highquality seats are always more expensive than low-quality seats. The price limit and the
price relationships are described in Table 29.
Myopic Monotone Dynamic Prices Seat section prices are optimized in the same
way as the myopic dynamic prices. However, prices are not allowed to decrease over time,
following the internal pricing policy of the partner franchise.
Several constraints are imposed on the optimization. First, the minimum prices for each
seat section are set to be the price observed on the very last day of the fixed pricing regime.
For the myopic monotone dynamic prices, price decrease over time is also not allowed.
111

Maximum price constraints for each seat section are imposed at a reasonable price point
based on discussions with the managers. Price-quality relationship constraints (prescribed
by the franchise a priori) must also be maintained so that higher quality seat sections
are always more expensive than lower quality seat sections. The price-quality relationship
constraints are implemented by expressing seat section prices relative to baseline seat section
prices (Premium 3, Outfield 2, Upper Deck 3, and Bleacher prices). The price limits and
seat section relationships are described in 29. The numerical optimization is performed with
the DEoptimR package in the R Programming Language.
Table 34: Expected Revenue from Optimized Dynamic Pricing Policies (43 Home Games)

Initial Fixed Prices
Actual Dynamic Prices
Myopic Dynamic Prices
Myopic Monotone Dynamic Prices
Myopic Dynamic Prices (5% Discount)

Total Revenue ($K)
4,037
3,953
4,286
4,099
4,643

Change ($K)
-84
+249
+62
+606

Change (%)
-2.1
+6.2
+1.5
+15.0

Table 34 shows the total revenue from each of the pricing policies under consideration.
The results show that the myopic dynamic pricing policy improves revenue by 6.2% over
the initial fixed pricing policy, in contrast to the actual dynamic pricing policy. Figure 24
shows the optimized price path for several seat sections for the home game shown in Figure
17. The bold lines indicate the model optimized prices while the dashed lines indicate the
actual dynamic prices adopted by the franchise. Note that actual prices for the Bleacher
section is not visible since its price is constrained to be $10 at all times.
There are several interesting characteristics observed in the optimized dynamic prices. First,
the myopic dynamic prices reveal mispricing in the original pricing scheme. The most
notable example of this can be seen in the correction made to the Outfield 2 section and the
Upper Deck 3 sections. In the actual pricing policy, the Outfield 2 seats are more expensive
compared to Upper Deck 3 seats. However, optimization based on the customer demand
model indicates that Upper Deck 3 seats should be more expensive than Outfield 2 seats at
all times. Both seat sections are also underpriced by more than $10 in the original pricing
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Figure 24: Model Optimized Price Path for a Home Game (Myopic Dynamic Prices)

policy. Second, the optimized policy identifies arrival timings of different customer classes
and adjust pricing accordingly. In this example, the prices for the 1st/3rd Base Line section
is decreasing in time, while the prices for the Outfield 2 section is increasing in time. This
is consistent with the estimates of our seat section choice model, which revealed that better
seats tend to get sold earlier. The 1st/3rd Base Line section, which is considered a high
quality seat section, is offered at a discount when there is less proportion of customers who
are likely to prefer higher quality seats, while the opposite is true for Outfield 2 section.
Another interesting observation is that imposing a monotone price path assumption can
significantly reduce the effectiveness of a dynamic pricing policy. It can be shown that even
a well-calibrated fixed pricing policy can outperform the myopic monotone dynamic price
(see Section 4.5.3). This is because the myopic monotone dynamic pricing policy increased
ticket prices until mid-July, but was unable to subsequently lower ticket prices when the
team started performing poorly on the field. Forcing a non-decreasing price path also did
not allow it to take advantage of heterogeneous arrival timing for different customer classes.
Monotone pricing is unable to lower prices for higher quality seat section over time when it
would have been advantageous to do so. The results indicate that around 76% (4.7% out
of 6.2%) of the best possible revenue improvement comes from the ability to lower prices
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and address future demand variation from the win effect and the crowd effect.
To further demonstrate the value of pricing flexibility, the lower bound of the ticket prices
can be adjusted while allowing price decreases over time. In this example, we allow a maximum 5% discount from the initial prices observed on the very last day of the fixed pricing
regime. The last row in Table 34 shows that when such discount is allowed, the franchise
is now able to achieve 15% revenue improvement over the benchmark. The optimized price
path for the myopic dynamic pricing policy with 5% discount allowed is shown in Figure
25.
Figure 25: Price Path of Optimized Myopic Dynamic Pricing Policy (5% Discount Allowed).

4.5.3. Effectiveness of Fixed Pricing Policies
We now compare the performance of optimized dynamic prices to the performance of optimized fixed prices. The results show that optimal fixed pricing policy can achieve nearly
the same level of revenue improvement as a myopically optimal dynamic price. This result
is consistent with the analysis of fixed price heuristics in Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994).
When the demand function is well known and the problem size is sufficiently large, dynamic
pricing provides minimal improvement over a well-calibrated fixed pricing policy. This result shows that the majority of the revenue improvement observed in this particular case is

114

a direct result of the customer demand process modeling.
We focus on two fixed pricing policies: single-day fixed prices and clairvoyant fixed prices.
Single-Day Fixed Prices

Ticket prices are optimized to maximize the expected daily

revenue on the first day of the second pricing regime, but only for this single day. Prices
are not allowed to vary across time thereafter.
Clairvoyant Fixed Prices

Under the assumption of perfect knowledge of future team

performance, we use the three-stage customer demand model to compute expected revenue
for the entire selling season given a set of fixed prices. Fixed price combinations are searched
to maximize the expected revenue for the entire selling period.
The revenue estimates from the single-day fixed prices and the myopic dynamic prices allow
the comparison of the performance between a fixed pricing policy versus a similar dynamic
pricing policy. The difference between these two policy is the additional value of dynamic
pricing compared to fixed pricing. Clairvoyant fixed prices, while not implementable in
practice, also serves as a benchmark for the maximum possible revenue improvement from
a fixed pricing policy. Table 35 shows the performance improvement from each pricing
policy, including the case where a maximum of 5% discount is allowed from the original
lower price limit. Figure 26 shows the optimized single-day fixed prices for several seat
sections in the home game shown in Figure 17, assuming a maximum 5% discount from
the original lower price limit. The bold lines indicate the model optimized prices while the
dashed lines indicate the actual dynamic prices adopted by the franchise. Note that actual
prices for the Bleacher section is not visible since its price is constrained to be $10 at all
times.
By comparing the single-day fixed prices and myopic dynamic prices, it can be seen that over
92-96% (5.7% out of 6.2% and 14.4% out of 15%) of the best possible revenue improvement
come from having better initial prices that are calibrated based on the customer demand
model. At the same time, there is relatively little value to having perfect knowledge of
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Table 35: Expected Revenue from Optimized Fixed Pricing Policies (43 Home Games)

Initial Fixed Prices
Actual Dynamic Prices
Myopic Dynamic Prices
Single-Day Fixed Prices
Clairvoyant Fixed Prices
Myopic Dynamic Prices (5% Discount)
Single-Day Fixed Prices (5% Discount)
Clairvoyant Fixed Prices (5% Discount)

Total Revenue ($K)
4,037
3,953
4,286
4,267
4,284
4,643
4,618
4,640

Change ($K)
-84
+249
+230
+247
+606
+581
+603

Change (%)
-2.1
+6.2
+5.7
+6.1
+15.0
+14.4
+14.9

Figure 26: Price Path of Optimized Single-Day Fixed Pricing Policy (5% Discount Allowed)
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future team performance (0.3% out of 6.2% and 0.5% out of 15%).
While there are clearly values in providing pricing flexibility (as shown in Section 4.5.2), it
can be observed there are relatively minimal value in the ability to make price adjustment
on the fly and future information, conditional on a well understood customer demand generation process. Again, this finding echoes that of Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994), and is
also closely related to recent findings on the value of price commitments under the presence
of strategic customers. Besbes and Lobel (2015) show that cyclic pricing policies can be a
form of optimal price commitment under the presence of strategic customers. Cachon and
Feldman (2015) show that committing to a frequent discount strategy is optimal, while a
fixed pricing strategy can sometimes outperform an infrequent markdown strategy. Finally,
Tereyagoglu et al. (2016) study pricing in theaters and show that committing to a monotone
discount policy can lead to 2.1%-6.7% revenue improvement.
The optimized fixed pricing policy is a particularly attractive notion for managers at our
partner franchise, who were concerned about maintaining a non-decreasing price path. They
believed that offering discount later in the selling horizon would give the impression that
they were “penalizing” customers that purchased early. Thus, the understanding that a
properly calibrated optimal fixed prices can help achieve similar level of revenue improvement as an optimized dynamic pricing policy was an especially important finding.
4.5.4. Decision-Rule Based Prices
Given the insight from the customer demand model, it is also reasonable to examine
the effectiveness of decision-rule based pricing policies. Consider a simple team performance and attendance based decision heuristic: for each home team win/loss, the team
increases/decreases the ticket prices by $1.09 and also adjusts the price based on changes
in overall attendance level ($3.47 increase for each additional 1% in overall attendance).
The price adjustment is made each day for all remaining home games, and assume no price
optimization at any point.
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Revenue forecasts were generated for this decision-rule based prices using the demand model
(for both the original price floor case and the 5% discount case). The results are summarized
in Table 36. Figure 27 shows the decision-rule based prices for several seat sections in the
home game shown in Figure 17, assuming a maximum 5% discount from the original lower
price limit. The bold lines indicate the decision-rule based prices while the dashed lines
indicate the actual dynamic prices adopted by the franchise. Note that actual prices for the
Bleacher section is not visible since its price is constrained to be $10 at all times.
Table 36: Expected Revenue from Decision-Rule Based Prices

Initial Fixed Prices
Actual Dynamic Prices
Decision-Rule Prices (Original Price Floor)
Decision-Rule Prices (5% Discount Allowed)

Total Revenue ($K)
4,037
3,953
3,995
4,142

Change ($K)
-84
-42
+105

Change (%)
-2.1
-1.0
+2.6

Figure 27: Price Path of Decision-Rule Based Pricing Policy (5% Discount Allowed)

The results show that the decision-rule based prices yield significantly less benefit compared
to the optimized prices. When prices are not allowed to decrease below the original price
floor, the decision-rule prices reduce revenue by 1.0%, and allowing 5% discount leads
to 2.6% revenue improvement. This result is consistent with the earlier finding that the
majority of revenue improvement is due to having better initial prices rather than a better
price adjustment mechanism.
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At the same time, it is also important to note that the decision-rule based prices outperform the actual dynamic prices adopted by the franchise. In practice, the decision-rule
based pricing policy also be an attractive option for managers since it provides a clear and
intuitive guideline for dynamic pricing. Similar to the myopically optimized dynamic pricing policy, the performance of the decision rule policy can be improved by adding extra
pricing flexibility and better initial prices.

4.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we study practical challenges of implementing and calibrating dynamic
pricing policies. We build a customer demand model that accounts for real-time, exogenous
changes in customer valuation to generate revenue forecast given a pricing policy. We
estimate and validate the model using a ticket sales data from an MLB franchise during
a recent MLB season with two different pricing regimes: a fixed price regime for the first
half of the season and a dynamic pricing regime for the second half. The demand model is
able to generate a forecast for aggregate revenue whose prediction error is within 5% of the
actual observed revenue.
The model estimates reveal that team performance and overall attendance at the time of
purchase significantly affect the demand for sports tickets. An extra win for the home
team has the same effect on demand as lowering ticket prices by $1.09, while a 1% higher
overall attendance has the same effect on demand as lowering ticket prices by $3.47. Using
the demand model, we are able to evaluate the effectiveness of various dynamic pricing
policies. These analyses show that it is possible to improve revenue by up to 15% by
introducing dynamic pricing and providing sufficient pricing flexibility. At the same time, a
well-calibrated fixed price policy can perform nearly as well as an optimized dynamic pricing
policy. In this particular case, more than 90% of possible revenue improvement comes from
optimizing the fixed price policy.
We contribute to the understanding of revenue management by empirically investigating a
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case of complex multiproduct dynamic pricing. We offer guidances on overcoming practical
challenges in implementing effective dynamic pricing strategies by proposing a three stage
demand model that allows managers to consider the effect of substitution while maintaining practical computational feasibility. The analyses of the various dynamic pricing policies
reveals that there is significant value to a detailed customer demand modeling approach,
and that proper model calibration through rigorous estimation and demand learning can be
an integral component of dynamic pricing policy design. Finally, by developing a comprehensive customer demand model, firms can evaluate the revenue impact of dynamic pricing
policies even when randomized experiments are infeasible, and also evaluate the financial
impact of various internal pricing policies.
While this work focuses on the sports entertainment industry, this general framework can
be applied to many other settings as well. Recent advances in data analytics and availability
of customer data significantly facilitates the development of customer behavior models in
many industries. Thus, it is important for managers to learn more about their customers
and leverage these information to make better pricing decision.
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M. Gümüş, S. Li, W. Oh, and S. Ray. Shipping fees or shipping free? A tale of two price
partitioning strategies in online retailing. Production and Operations Management, 22
(4):758–776, 2013.

123

S. Guo and M. W. Fraser. Propensity score analysis: Statistical methods and applications,
volume 11. Sage Publications, 2014.
T. B. Heath, S. Chatterjee, and K. R. France. Mental accounting and changes in price: The
frame dependence of reference dependence. Journal of Consumer Research, 22(1):90–97,
1995.
K. Hirano and G. W. Imbens. Estimation of causal effects using propensity score weighting:
An application to data on right heart catheterization. Health Services and Outcomes
research methodology, 2(3-4):259–278, 2001.
K. Hirano, G. W. Imbens, and G. Ridder. Efficient estimation of average treatment effects
using the estimated propensity score. Econometrica, 71(4):1161–1189, 2003.
T. H. Ho and Y.-S. Zheng. Setting customer expectation in service delivery: An integrated
marketing-operations perspective. Management Science, 50(4):479–488, 2004.
G. W. Imbens and J. M. Wooldridge. Recent developments in the econometrics of program
evaluation. Journal of economic literature, 47(1):5–86, 2009.
S. Jasin and S. Kumar. A re-solving heuristic with bounded revenue loss for network revenue
management with customer choice. Mathematics of Operations Research, 37(2):313–345,
2012.
R. L. Keeney. The value of internet commerce to the customer. Management science, 45
(4):533–542, 1999.
J. H. Kim. Conditional tail moments of the exponential family and its related distributions.
North American Actuarial Journal, 14(2):198–216, 2010.
D. Koushik, J. A. Higbie, and C. Eister.
Retail
InterContinental Hotels Group. Interfaces, 42(1):45–57, 2012.

price

optimization

at

A. Kumar, A. Mehra, and S. Kumar. Impact of facilitating store usage on customers’
online purchase behavior. 2014. Working Paper, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2500942.
B. Lam.
There’s no such thing as free shipping.
The Atlantic, 2014.
(Nov
30),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/11/
theres-no-such-thing-as-free-shipping/383234/.
M. Leng and R. Becerril-Arreola. Joint pricing and contingent free-shipping decisions in
B2C transactions. Production and Operations Management, 19(4):390–405, 2010.
P. Leslie. Price discrimination in Broadway theater. RAND Journal of Economics, pages
520–541, 2004.

124

M. Lewis, V. Singh, and S. Fay. An empirical study of the impact of nonlinear shipping
and handling fees on purchase incidence and expenditure decisions. Marketing Science,
25(1):51–64, 2006.
K. Y. Lin. Dynamic pricing with real-time demand learning. European Journal of Operational Research, 174(1):522–538, 2006.
Y. Lu, A. Musalem, M. Olivares, and A. Schilkrut. Measuring the effect of queues on
customer purchases. Management Science, 59(8):1743–1763, 2013.
Y. Lu, Y. Chen, M. Song, and X. Yan. Optimal pricing and inventory control policy with
quantity-based price differentiation. Operations Research, 62(3):512–523, 2014.
C. Maglaras and J. Meissner. Dynamic pricing strategies for multiproduct revenue management problems. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 8(2):136–148, 2006.
National Retail Federation. The nation’s retail power players 2014. STORES Magazine,
July 2014. http://pages.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/nrfe/STORES0714/offline/nrfe_
STORES0714.pdf.
W. W. Moe, P. Fader, and B. Kahn. Buying tickets: Capturing the dynamic factors that
drive consumer purchase decision for sporting events. In Presentation at the MIT Sloan
Sports Analytics Conference, 2011.
K. Moinzadeh and S. Nahmias. Adjustment strategies for a fixed delivery contract. Operations Research, 48(3):408–423, 2000.
C. L. Munson and M. J. Rosenblatt. Theories and realities of quantity discounts: An
exploratory study. Production and operations management, 7(4):352–369, 1998.
J. P. Newman, M. E. Ferguson, L. A. Garrow, and T. L. Jacobs. Estimation of choicebased models using sales data from a single firm. Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management, 16(2):184–197, 2014.
J.-S. Pang, C.-L. Su, and Y.-C. Lee. A constructive approach to estimating pure characteristics demand models with pricing. Operations Research, 63(3):639–659, 2015.
R. S. Rao and R. Schaefer. Conspicuous consumption and dynamic pricing. Marketing
Science, 32(5):786–804, 2013.
P. R. Rosenbaum. Model-based direct adjustment. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 82(398):387–394, 1987.
R. T. Rust and T. S. Chung. Marketing models of service and relationships. Marketing
Science, 25(6):560–580, 2006.
T. Ryan.

Macy’s, others turn stores into online fulfillment centers.

125

Forbes,

2013.
(April 3),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/retailwire/2013/04/03/
macys-others-turn-stores-into-online-fulfillment-centers.
K. Shampanier, N. Mazar, and D. Ariely. Zero as a special price: The true value of free
products. Marketing science, 26(6):742–757, 2007.
J. Shang, T. P. Yildirim, P. Tadikamalla, V. Mittal, and L. H. Brown. Distribution network
redesign for marketing competitiveness. Journal of Marketing, 73(2):146–163, 2009.
S. Sriram, P. K. Chintagunta, and P. Manchanda. Service quality variability and termination
behavior. Management Science, 61(11):2739–2759, 2015.
L. Stevens and S. Banjo.
Free shipping is going to cost you more.
Wall
Street Journal,
2014.
(October 22),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/
free-shipping-is-going-to-cost-you-more-1414003507.
T. Stynes.
Target lowers free shipping minimum to $25.
Wall
Street Journal,
2015.
(February 23),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/
target-lowers-free-shipping-minimum-to-25-1424701268.
J. M. Swaminathan and S. R. Tayur. Models for supply chains in e-business. Management
Science, 49(10):1387–1406, 2003.
A. Sweeting. Dynamic pricing behavior in perishable goods markets: Evidence from secondary markets for Major League Baseball tickets. Journal of Political Economy, 120(6):
1133–1172, 2012.
K. Talluri and G. Van Ryzin. Revenue management under a general discrete choice model
of consumer behavior. Management Science, 50(1):15–33, 2004.
N. Tereyagoglu, P. Fader, and S. K. Veeraraghavan. Pricing theater seats: The value
of price commitment and monotone discounting. 2016. Working Paper, Georgia Tech
Scheller College of Business, Atlanta, GA.
R. Thaler. Mental accounting and consumer choice. Marketing science, 4(3):199–214, 1985.
A. Tversky and D. Kahneman. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice.
In Environmental Impact Assessment, Technology Assessment, and Risk Analysis, pages
107–129. Springer, 1985.
S. Veeraraghavan and R. Vaidyanathan. Measuring seat value in stadiums and theaters.
Production and Operations Management, 21(1):49–68, 2012.
G. Vulcano, G. Van Ryzin, and R. Ratliff. Estimating primary demand for substitutable
products from sales transaction data. Operations Research, 60(2):313–334, 2012.
Z. Wang, S. Deng, and Y. Ye. Close the gaps: A learning-while-doing algorithm for singleproduct revenue management problems. Operations Research, 62(2):318–331, 2014.
126

J. D. Whitney. Winning games versus winning championships: The economics of fan interest
and team performance. Economic Inquiry, 26(4):703–724, 1988.
J.-D. Zhu. Effect of resale on optimal ticket pricing: Evidence from Major League Baseball
tickets. 2014. Working paper, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX.

127

